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ARTICLES




Pet animals play an extremely significant role in the lives
of many individuals.1 People own pets for a variety of rea-
sons: they love animals;2 enjoy engaging in physical activity
with the animal, such as playing ball or going for walks;3 and
relish the giving and receiving of attention and unconditional
love.4 Research indicates that pet ownership positively im-
pacts the owner's life by lowering blood pressure, reducing
stress and depression, lowering the risk of heart disease,
shortening the recovery time after a hospitalization, and im-
proving concentration and mental attitude.5
Over two-thirds of pet owners treat their animals as
members of their families.' Twenty percent of Americans
* Visiting Professor of Law, Santa Clara University; Professor of Law, St.
Mary's University. LL.M. & J.S.D., University of Illinois; J.D., Ohio State Uni-
versity; B.A., Eastern Michigan University. The author would like to express
his appreciation for the excellent research assistance provided by the following
individuals: Christopher Alva, Jessica A. Petrini, and Stephen R. Turkett.
1. See CHRISTINE ADAMEC, WHEN YOUR PET DIEs 11-20 (1996) (describing
the various ways in which pet animals enhance human life); WALLACE SIFE,
THE LOSS OF A PET 1 (1993) (explaining how pet owners "configure [their] life-
styles around this cherished adopted family member").
2. See ADAMEC, supra note 1, at 12.
3. See id. at 16.
4. See id. at 10.
5. See id. at 13; A Dog's Life (or Cat's) Could Benefit Your Own, SAN
ANTONiO EXPRESS-NEWs, May 18, 1998, at 1B (explaining how some insurance
companies lower life insurance rates for older owners of pets).
6. See Cindy Hall & Suzy Parker, USA Snapshots-What We Do For Our
617
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
have even altered their romantic relationships over pet dis-
putes. 7  Pet owners are extremely devoted to their animal
companions with 80% bragging about their pets to others,
79% allowing their pets to sleep in bed with them, 37% car-
rying pictures of their pets in their wallets, and 31% taking
time off from work to be with their sick pets.8 According to
one popular newspaper, during the December 1999 holiday
season, the average pet owner spent $95 on gifts for their
pets.9
The number of individuals who own animals is stagger-
ing. As many as 33.9 million households in the United States
own dogs and 28.3 million own cats."0 In addition to these
traditional pets, Americans also own a wide variety of other
animals. For example, there are eleven million households
with fish, six million with birds, five million with small ani-
mals (such as hamsters and rabbits), and three million with
reptiles."
An owner's love for his pet transcends death, as docu-
mented by studies revealing that between 12% and 27% of pet
owners include pets in their wills. 2 The popular media fre-
Pets, USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 1999, at 1D; see also ADAMEC, supra note 1, at 14.
7. See Andre Mouchard, Book Prepares Pet Owners For Loss of Their Loved
Ones, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 16, 1999, at 2E.
8. See Hall & Parker, supra note 6, at 1D; see also Four-Legged Friends,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Nov. 28, 1994, at 6E (reporting that 57% of cat
owners and 59% of dog owners permit their pets to sleep with them).
9. See Anne R. Carey & Marcy E. Mullins, USA Snapshots-Surfing For
Man's Best Friend, USA TODAY, Dec. 16, 1999, at 1B; see also Dina Temple-
Raston, Canine Cuisine Fetches Success, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 2000, at 12B (re-
porting that 79% of pet-owning poll respondents give pets holiday or birthday
gifts).
10. See Richard Mendelson, Carving Out Your Niche, A.B.A. J., May 1997,
at 48, 50.
11. See Gregory Potts, Pampered Pets Prove Profitable, J. REC. (Oklahoma
City), July 6, 1999; see also Susan Okie, Reptiles, Young Kids Can Be Unhealthy
Mix, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC. (N.C.), Jan. 4, 2000, at D5 (reporting that 3%
of households in the United States own reptiles).
12. See Anne R. Carey & Marcy E. Mullins, USA Snapshots-Man's Best
Friend?, USA TODAY, Dec. 2, 1999, at 1B (12%); Elys A. McLean, USA Snap-
shots-Fat Cats-and Dogs, USA TODAY, June 28, 1993, at 1D (27%); Vital Sta-
tistics, HEALTH, Oct. 1998, at 16 (18%); JON WINOKUR, MONDO CANINE 40
(1991) (citing Harper's Index as reporting that approximately one million
American dogs have been named as will beneficiaries). See generally Publica-
tions Committee of the State Bar of Nevada, State Bar Public Services, Answers
to Your Questions About Providing for Your Pets (visited Mar. 30, 2000)
<http-//www.nvbar.org/public/pets.html> (providing guidance to pet owners on
how to make arrangements for the care of their pets upon disability or death).
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quently reports cases involving pet owners who provide for
the care of their beloved companions after death."3 For exam-
ple, singer Dusty Springfield's will made extensive provisions
for her cat, Nicholas. The will instructed that Nicholas' bed
be lined with Dusty's nightgown, Dusty's recordings be played
each night at Nicholas' bedtime, and that Nicholas be fed im-
ported baby food.'4 Doris Duke, the sole heir to tobacco baron
"Buck" Duke, who founded Duke University and started the
American Tobacco Company, left $100,000 in trust for the
benefit of her dog. 5 Natalie Schafer, the actress who por-
trayed "Lovey" on the television program Gilligan's Island,
provided that her fortune be used for the benefit of her dog. 6
The wills of well-known individuals who are still alive may
also contain pet provisions. For example, actress Betty White
reportedly has a will that leaves her estate, which is esti-
mated at $5 million, for the benefit of her pets. Likewise,
Oprah Winfrey's will purportedly mandates that her dog live
out his life in luxury.8
13. The public's interest in gifts for the benefit of animals is longstanding.
See Bequest or Trust for Care of an Animal, CASE & COM., Feb./Mar. 1925, at 8,
8 ("[T]he daily press occasionally mentions a legacy for the benefit of the testa-
tor's horses, dogs or a pet cat or bird."). In addition to the popular cases dis-
cussed in the text, see WINOKUR, supra note 12, at 40 (citing Wayne Kirn's 1990
365 Dogs Calendar as discussing the will of Eleanor Ritchey, who died in 1968
leaving $5 million to 150 stray dogs that lived on her Florida ranch). See also
Cat Heir, PEOPLE, Aug. 31, 1998, at 126 (describing trust for $200,000 estab-
lished by a pet owner to care for Ming, a cat); Estate Going to the Dogs, Pig,
Parrot, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, July 4, 1990, at 13D (describing wills of
Iowa residents that included provisions for Mr. Pig, a 150-pound hog; Calamity
Jane, a German shepherd; and Chico, an Amazon parrot); Susie Phillips, Will
Benefits Library, Dogs, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 20, 1989, at 2B (re-
porting on pet owner's will which established a $25,000 trust for the care of two
poodles, Jack Daniels and Danielle); Royal Corgis Get 30G in Dog Lover's Will,
SAN ANTONIO STAR, Jan. 14, 1990, at 2 (reporting that an English citizen left
her entire fortune to Queen Elizabeth's prized corgis).
14 See Dusty's Cool Fat Cat, PEOPLE, Apr. 19, 1999, at 11; see also Purrr-
fect Ending-The Late Dusty Springfield's Beloved Pet Nicholas is Still Living
Like a Fat Cat, PEOPLE, Dec. 31, 1999, at 170 (reporting that Nicholas is enjoy-
ing the pampered lifestyle Dusty intended).
15. See Walter Scott, Personality Parade, PARADE MAG., Sept. 11, 1994, at 2;
see also In re Estate of Duke, No. 4440/93, slip op. (N.Y. Sur. Ct. N.Y. County
July 31, 1997) (upholding trust and quoting relevant provisions of Duke's will).
16. See Beverly Williston, Gilligan's Lovey Leaves It All to Her Dog, SAN
ANTONIO STAR, Apr. 28, 1991, at 5.
17. See Betty White Leaves $5M to Her Pets, SAN ANTONIO STAR, Nov. 4,
1990, at 25; Jennifer Pearson, Broken-Hearted Betty Tends Shrines to Her Two
Greatest Loves, SAN ANTONIO STAR, Nov. 24, 1991, at 12.
18. See Janet Charlton, Star People, SAN ANTONIO STAR, Mar. 3, 1996, at 2.
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Will the legal system permit animal owners to accom-
plish their goal of providing after-death care for their pets?
The common law courts of England looked favorably on gifts
to support specific animals. 9 This approach, however, did not
cross the Atlantic. "Historically, the approach of most Ameri-
can courts towards bequests for the care of specific animals
has not been calculated to gladden the hearts of animal lov-
ers." ' Attempted gifts in favor of specific animals have usu-
ally failed for a variety of reasons, such as violating the rule
against perpetuities because the measuring life was not hu-
man, or being an unenforceable honorary trust because there
was no human or legal entity to serve as a beneficiary to en-
force the trust.
21
The persuasiveness of these two traditional legal grounds
for prohibiting gifts in favor of pet animals is waning under
modern law.22 Courts and legislatures increasingly permit
such arrangements by applying a variety of techniques and
policies." Furthermore, in 1990, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws added a section to the
Uniform Probate Code to validate "a trust for the care of a
designated domestic or pet animal and the animal's off-
spring."'4 Some states have already adopted this section or
other legislation with a similar purpose.' In addition, a
growing number of jurisdictions have abolished the rule
against perpetuities.6
This article chronicles the evolution of enforcing after-
death gifts for the benefit of pet animals. Part II reviews the
common law background. Part III details the wide variety of
approaches adopted by United States courts, legislatures, and
commentators. These approaches treat after-death gifts for
19. See infra Part II.
20. Barbara W. Schwartz, Estate Planning for Animals, 113 TR. & EST. 376,
376 (1974); see also Errol Blank, Trusts for Animals in New York-Beneficiaries
and Perpetuities, SYRACUSE L. REV. 705, 706 (1966) (recognizing reluctance of
American courts to uphold trusts to benefit specific animals).
2L See infra Part III.B.
22. See infra Part HI.C-D; cf James T. Brennan, Bequests for the Care of
Specific Animals, 6 DUQ. L. REV. 15, 39 (1967) (indicating that as of the mid-
1960s, "it does not appear that there is any judicial trend toward upholding the
validity of bequests for specific animals").
23. See infra Part III.C-D.
24. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907 (1990); see infra Part III.D.1.
25. See infra Parts III.D.l.c & III.D.2.
26. See infra Part I.D.3.
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pets in three basic categories: (1) invalid; (2) tolerated, but
not enforceable; and (3) valid and enforceable. After estab-
lishing the current milieu in which a pet owner must func-
tion, Part IV recommends the steps an owner may take to
maximize the chances of the pet receiving the desired care af-
ter the owner's death.
II. COMMON LAw BACKGROUND
The common law courts of England have recognized tes-
tamentary provisions in favor of specific animals for well over
a century. The first case to address the issue, however, did
not foreshadow this approach.' In the 1750 case of Attorney-
General v. Whorwood,"9 the court stated in dicta that courts
should not validate gifts that provide "odd" or "whimsical"
gifts, such as gifts for the feeding of sparrows." The court
opined that this type of use, although neither "superstitious"
nor "illegal," was "indifferent" and should not be enforced.
The court especially focused on the potential of the gift last-
ing indefinitely and thus violating the rule against perpetui-
ties.3
It was not until almost a hundred years later, in 1842,
that another English court had the opportunity to address a
gift involving specific animals. In Pettingall v. Pettingall,32
the pet owner provided that a fixed amount be paid for the
benefit of his black mare. The will explained exactly what the
owner desired as follows:
I hereby bequeath, that at my death, 501. per annum be
paid for her keep in some park in England or Wales; her
shoes to be taken off, and she never to be ridden or put in
harness; and that my executor consider himself in honour
bound to fulfil my wish, and see that she be well provided
27. See Brennan, supra note 22, at 21 (concluding that the "English position
on bequests for the care of specific animals is that they are valid"). See gener-
ally Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 33 (1999) (providing exhaustive analysis of gifts for purposes and con-
cluding that they should be subsumed within the category of charitable gifts).
28. See Attorney-General v. Whorwood, 27 Eng. Rep. 1188 (Ch. 1750); see
also Brennan, supra note 22, at 16 (concluding that Whorwood is "generally re-
garded as the first English case involving the validity of bequests for the care of
specific animals").
29. Whorwood, 27 Eng. Rep. at 1188.
30. Id. at 1189.
3L See id.
32. Pettingall v. Pettingall, 11 L.J.-Ch. 176 (1842).
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for .... At her death all payment to cease.
The Pettingall case provided the basis for the court to make a
direct ruling on the validity of provisions for the benefit of
specific animals. However, since all parties assumed the gift
valid, the court addressed other issues. 4
Six years later, the court, in Mitford v. Reynolds, 3 also
sidestepped the opportunity to provide an extensive discus-
sion of the validity of a gift for the benefit of animals. The
court addressed a will containing a residuary clause that ex-
empted from its coverage "the annual amount that will be
requisite to defray the keep of my horses (which I will and di-
rect be preserved as pensioners, and are never, under any
plea or pretence, to be used, rode or driven, or applied to la-
bour)."3' The lower court upheld the provision and the appel-
late court believed itself bound by that decision.3 ' Accord-
ingly, the validity of the gift for the horses' benefit was not a
critical issue in the case.38
It was not until the 1888 case of In re Dean39 that an
English court directly addressed the validity of a testamen-
tary trust for the maintenance of specific animals. The ani-
mal owner directed his trustees to pay £750 per year for the
maintenance of his horses and hounds. The trust was to con-
tinue for the animals' lifetimes, but in no event longer than
fifty years.
40
33. Id. at 177.
34. See id. (discussing whether the form of the decree was proper and the
appropriate disposition of funds not needed for the mare's care).
35. Mitford v. Reynolds, 60 Eng. Rep. 812 (1848).
36. Id. at 813.
37. See id. at 817.
38. See id.; see also In re Dean, 41 Ch. D. 552, 560 (1888) (finding that no
"formal discussion took place upon" the issue); Brennan, supra note 22, at 16
(concluding that the animal provision "was not forcefully challenged").
39. Dean, 41 Ch. D. at 552.
40. See id. at 553. The owner included a variety of other instructions re-
garding the animals, such as a direction that they "be kept in the stables, ken-
nels and buildings which they now occupy," that the horses and ponies "not be
worked after [the owner's] death, but may at all times be exercised on [the
owner's] freehold property," and that the hounds not be sold. Id. The extent of
the owner's concern for his animals even extended to how the horses and ponies
were to be killed, if necessary: "[the animals] shall be shot with a double-
barrelled gun, both barrels loaded at the same time, with clean barrels and a
full charge." Id. at 553-54.
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The court began its analysis by recognizing that because
the benefits were limited to his animals, rather than being for
the benefit of animals generally, the owner did not make a
charitable gift.41 The court also determined that the owner
did not make the gift to the trustees personally, because the
will clearly referred to them as trustees and imposed a host of
management responsibilities (i.e., the language regarding the
horses and hounds was not merely precatory).42 Thus, for the
gift to stand, it must constitute an honorary trust, that is, a
trust which lacks both human beneficiaries and a charitable
purpose, yet directs the trustee to use the money for a speci-
fied legal purpose.
The contestants urged that the trust failed because it
lacked a beneficiary with the capacity to enforce the trust.43
The court turned this argument aside by referring to other
situations where trusts are valid even though there is no
beneficiary, such as when a testator establishes a trust to
erect a monument."" The court determined that the gift for
the horses and dogs was not "obnoxious to the law," but
warned that the trust cannot "last for too long a period." 5
The trust must end "within the limits fixed by the rule
against perpetuities.""8 The duration of the trust was pegged
to the life of the animals, but not to exceed fifty years.' The
court assumed, but did not expressly hold, that this trust did
not violate the rule."8
Subsequent English cases continued the "common sense
determination [of the Dean case] that.., bequests [for the
care of specific animals] do not contravene public morality
and the public policy reasons behind the rules of law which
require a [beneficiary] and compliance with the rule against
perpetuities." 9 For example, the pet owner in In re Hawkins"
directed the trustee to pay a fixed amount each week for the
4L See id. at 556.
42. See id. at 561.
43. See id. at 556.
44. See id. at 557.
45. Dean, 41 Ch. D. at 557.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 553.
48. See id. at 557.
49. Brennan, supra note 22, at 21.
50. In re Hawkins, 1 Ch. 67 (1942).
6232000]
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upkeep of his dogs and horses.51 The court assumed the va-
lidity of the gift, and rendered a decision addressing tax con-
cerns.
5 2
The courts and commentators of other common law na-
tions adopted similar approaches." In the Irish case of In re
Estate of Kelly, 4 the pet owner left one hundred pounds ster-
ling to his executors and trustees "for the purpose of expend-
ing four pounds sterling on the support of each of my dogs per
year."5 In addition, the owner directed that his "dogs be kept
in the old house at Upper Tullaroan."5 The will then pro-
vided for passage of the remainder of the estate, if any." The
court expressed concern about the remoteness of vesting of
this remainder interest and concluded the measuring lives for
rule against perpetuities purposes must be human." The
court refused to take judicial notice of the fact that the dogs
could not actually outlive the owner by more than twenty-one
years." In fact, the court refused to acknowledge that even a
butterfly could not outlive its owner by more than twenty-one
years. Accordingly, the court felt compelled to invalidate the
remainder gift.
51 See id. at 68.
52. See id. at 69 (holding that the payments for the animals were definite
amounts and thus must be reduced for taxes under the applicable statute).
53. See generally Phillip Jamieson, Trusts for the Maintenance of Particular
Animals, 14 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 175, 177 (1987) (discussing "paucity of Aus-
tralian authority" and concluding that the English decisions have "strong per-
suasive authority"); Kenneth McK. Norrie, Trusts for Animals, 22 J.L. SoC'Y
SCOT. 386 (1977) (concluding that Scottish law should approve honorary trusts
for animals); John J. Robinette, Rule Against Perpetuities-Bequest for the
Maintenance of Dogs-Interpretation, 11 CANADIAN B. REv. 56 (1933) (discuss-
ing the English and Irish cases with approval).
54 In re Estate of Kelly, [19321 1 I.R. 255 (Ir. H. Ct.). For further discus-
sion of this case, see Note, Rule Against Perpetuities-Animal Lives as "Lives in
Being"-Cutting Down Honorary Trust to Legal Period, 46 HARV. L. REv. 1036
(1933).
55. Kelly, 1 I.R. at 256.
56. Id.
57. See id. (leaving remainder to priest for the saying of masses).
58. See id. at 260 (explaining that it is "absurd" to think of lives in being as
potentially referring to those of "specified carp, or tortoises, or other animals
that might live for over a hundred years").
59. See id. at 261 (commenting that "neighbour's dogs and cats are unpleas-
antly long-lived").
60. See id. For a satirical treatment of the court's position, see William
Franklin Fratcher, The Missouri Perpetuities Act, 45 Mo. L. REV. 240, 242
(1980).
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The court next examined the gift to the dogs and consid-
ered whether it violated the rule against perpetuities in light
of the fact that the trust lacked a beneficiary.61 The pet owner
had four dogs, and at £4 per year, the money left in trust
would be depleted long before twenty-one years elapsed.62
The court avoided an interpretation that the gift to the dogs
was actually for their lives, finding that any reference to the
dogs' lives was only in connection with the remainder gift,
which had already been invalidated.' Accordingly, the court
concluded that "there is a valid severable trust for twenty-one
years succeeding the death of the testator, provided any of the
dogs live so long."' The court did not address the problem of
there being no beneficiary to enforce this trust, because the
trustees were willing to carry out the pet owner's intent.65
III. UNITED STATES APPROACHES
The first reported case in the United States dealing with
a gift for the benefit of a specific animal occurred in 1923.66
Kentucky's highest court determined that the testator's desire
to care for her pet dog was a humane purpose and thus
valid. This auspicious beginning was not generally followed.
Not until the late twentieth century did the tide towards ef-
fectuating a pet owner's desire to care for the pet after the
owner's death begin to rise again.' This section details the
variety of approaches that the courts, the drafters of the Re-
61 See Kelly, 1 I.R. at 262-63.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 263.
64. Id. at 264.
65. See id. at 261.
66. See Willett v. Willett, 247 S.W. 739 (Ky. 1923); see also Bequest or Trust
for Care of an Animal, supra note 13, at 8 (describing Willett as "the first
American case to pass on the validity of a bequest or trust for the care of a
specified animal"); Annotation, Validity of Bequest or Trust for Care of Specified
Animal, 31 A.L.R. 430, 430 (1923) [hereinafter Validity of Bequest] (deeming
Willett as "the only American case passing on the validity of a bequest or trust
for the care of a specified animal"); cf. Case Comment, Trust-Trust For Sup-
port of a Dog-Naming Trustee, 11 KY. L.J. 248, 249 (1923) ("There are very few
cases to be found, where a bequest was made for the use and benefit of ani-
mals.").
67. See Willett, 247 S.W. at 741.
68. See infra Parts Ill.C & m.D. See generally Jennifer R. Taylor, A "Pet"
Project for State Legislatures: The Movement Toward Enforceable Pet Trusts in
the Twenty-First Century, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 419, 439-40 (1999) (ac-
knowledging recent trend to recognize trusts for specific animals).
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statement of Trusts, and various state legislatures have
adopted since this landmark decision.
A. Restatement of Trusts
The 1935 Restatement of Trusts69 and the 1957 Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts ° adopt an approach midway between
invalidating trusts for pet animals and enforcing them by
recognizing these arrangements, but declining to provide any
enforcement mechanism. The Restatement does not specifi-
cally address the issue of trusts for pet animals in the text of
the applicable section. Instead, it refers to transfers that
meet two conditions. First, the transfer must be for a specific
noncharitable purpose. 1 Second, the transfer must not des-
ignate a definite or definitely ascertainable beneficiary.72 A
transfer for the benefit of a pet animal satisfies both of these
conditions because the care of a pet is a specific noncharitable
purpose and a pet animal is not an ascertainable beneficiary
(i.e., a person with standing to enforce a trust). The Restate-
ment provides that a transfer meeting these two criteria does
not create an enforceable trust and thus "the transferee is not
under a duty and cannot be compelled to apply the property
[for the care of the pet animal]."73
69. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 124 (1935). This section provides:
Where the owner of property transfers it upon an intended trust for a
specific non-charitable purpose and there is no definite or definitely as-
certainable beneficiary designated, no trust is created; but the trans-
feree has power to apply the property to the designated purpose, unless
he is authorized by the terms of the intended trust so to apply the
property beyond the period of the rule against perpetuities, or the pur-
pose is capricious.
Id.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 (1957). This section provides:
Where the owner of property transfers it in trust for a specific non-
charitable purpose, and there is no definite or definitely ascertainable
beneficiary designated, no enforceable trust is created; but the trans-
feree has power to apply the property to the designated purpose, unless
such application is authorized or directed to be made at a time beyond




73. Id. cmt. a. The Restatement rejects the use of the term "honorary trust"
because the transferee cannot be forced to apply the property for the designated




However, the transferee has the power to use the prop-
erty for the pet animal if the transferee elects to do so.' The
Restatement does not provide the transferee with any guid-
ance regarding how to exercise this power, except to impose
two limitations-one based on traditional legal rules and one
based on public policy. The first limitation is that the trans-
feree cannot be authorized or directed to use the property for
the pet animal at a time beyond the period of the rule against
perpetuities. '5 The second limitation prevents the trustee
from using the property for the pet animal if the court deems
the purpose capricious.7"
If the transferee decides not to use the property for the
benefit of the pet animal, the transferee is treated as holding
the property upon a resulting trust for the settlor or the set-
tlor's successors in interest." Accordingly, if the transferee
will not carry out the pet owner's intent to care for the ani-
mal, the property returns to the pet owner's estate and passes
to the owner's heirs or beneficiaries. The transferee may not
retain the property for the transferee's own use78 and may not
transfer the power to use the property for the animal to an-
other person.79
The comments to the Restatement reflect the drafters' in-
tent for this section's application to arrangements that pro-
vide for pet animals via gifts in trust, especially testamentary
trusts." The drafters provide the following illustration of a
gift to benefit a pet animal and the result under the Restate-
ment:
A bequeaths his dog, Fido, to B together with the sum of
$1000 "in trust" to use the money for the support of the
dog for twenty years. B cannot be compelled to use the
money for supporting the dog, but he has power to use the
money for this purpose and incurs no liability by doing so.
If B refuses or neglects to support the dog, he holds the
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 (1957).
77. See id. cmt. b.
78. See id.
79. See Brennan, supra note 22, at 22 (explaining that the power to use the
property for the animal is "personal to the donee of the power").
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. d (1957) (including
"support of animals" as purpose to which rule applies).
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money upon a resulting trust for A's estate."'
Careful wording of the transfer for the benefit of the pet
animal is required to gain the benefit of the Restatement's
grant of power to the transferee to use the property for the
pet animal. If the pet owner selected the life of the pet as the
period of time during which the transferee may use the prop-
erty for the pet, the arrangement fails for violating the rule
against perpetuities. The following language from the Re-
statement's comment is instructive:
[Wihere the devisee or legatee is authorized to apply the
property for the maintenance of one or more animals
during the lives of the animals, the provision is invalid
since the period of the rule against perpetuities is meas-
ured by the lives of persons and not lives of animals,
whether or not the normal duration of the life of the ani-
mal is shorter than that of a human being. Whether in
such cases the devisee or legatee can properly apply the
property for a period of twenty-one years, on the ground
that the annual payments are to be treated as separable,
812is not within the scope of the Restatement ....
Under the Restatement approach, the pet owner must be
conservative in determining the amount left for the benefit of
the pet. If the owner transfers an unreasonably large amount
of property, the court could deem the purpose capricious."3
The Restatement provides no guidance on how to determine
whether a transfer is unreasonably large. Upon a finding of
capriciousness, the transferee's power to use the property for
the pet ends and the property passes to the pet owner's suc-
cessors in interest.8
The Restatement approach is a marked improvement
over judicial holdings that gifts for the benefit of pet animals
are ineffective. A pet owner may carefully select a person to
use designated assets for the care of the pet and have some
assurance that the pet will receive proper care. However, the
effectiveness of this arrangement turns on the reliability of
the person the pet owner selects, because the arrangement is
81. Id. cmt. d, illus. 3.
82. Id. cmt. f.
83. See id. cmt. g (recognizing that the care of dogs is "not capricious unless




unenforceable.85 The pet owner may not legally force the
transferee to use the property for the pet. Although the
transferee cannot personally benefit from the property desig-
nated for the animal, there is no guarantee that the pet will
ever receive any benefit from the property.88 In addition, the
pet owner must not connect the duration of payments to the
life of the animal because to do so would violate the rule
against perpetuities." Lack of predictability and enforceabil-
ity, along with the need to draft around the rule against per-
petuities, makes the Restatement approach a poor choice for
pet owners who sincerely desire to provide for their pet ani-
mals upon death.
B. Judicial Disapproval
Many courts have frustrated an owner's intent to provide
long-term care for the pet after the owner's death. This sec-
tion reviews the technical grounds on which courts have re-
fused to recognize arrangements for animals.
1. Animals Cannot Hold Title
A direct gift of money or other property to a pet animal is
a legal impossibility. A pet animal is property' and one piece
of property cannot hold title to another piece of property.89
Accordingly, an owner's attempt to make a direct testamen-
85. See id. § 124.
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. b (1957).
87. See id. cmt. f.
88. See, e.g., Cathey v. Guenther, 47 F.3d 162, 163 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating
that the shooting of a cat upon the direction of local law enforcement was a
"taking" of property); Gerhart v. City of St. Louis, 270 S.W. 690, 683 (Mo. 1925)
(recognizing that "it has long been settled law that dogs are property in Mis-
souri, and that no one has the right to kill them except for just cause"); Bueck-
ner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tex. App. 1994, writ denied) (stating that
"Texas law recognizes a dog as personal property"). But see Corso v. Crawford
Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (Civ. Ct. 1979) (holding that "a pet
is not just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere in between a person
and a piece of personal property"); Steven M. Wise, Animal Thing to Animal
Person-Thoughts on Time, Place, and Theories, 5 ANIMAL L. 61, 62 (1999) (ar-
guing that treating animals as property "is as anachronistic as human slavery").
89. See WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF
WILLS § 17.21, at 851 ("Animals... certainly lack the capacity to acquire, hold
and dispose of property interests."); Note, Wills-Providing for Care of Specific
Animals, 21 TENN. L. REV. 678 (1951) (stating that "property has no capacity to
hold title to property").
6292000]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
tary gift to the pet will fail."0 For example, in the case of In re
Estate of Russell,9 the pet owner attempted to divide her re-
siduary estate between a close friend and her dog, Roxy Rus-
sell.92 The trial court attempted to carry out the owner's in-
tent by determining that the owner actually intended to leave
her entire estate to the friend with the hope that he would
care for the dog.93 The appellate court, however, believed that
it could not ignore the clear and unambiguous language of the
will, which divided the owner's estate between the friend and
Roxy.94 The court held that the gift to the dog was ineffective
because a dog cannot be a will beneficiary.95 The court also
rejected the argument that the pet owner created a trust for
the care of Roxy because the owner did not manifest any in-
tent to impose on the friend the duty to care for Roxy.96 Ac-
cordingly, the half of the owner's estate intended for Roxy
passed under intestacy to the owner's closest relative, a
niece.97
The same reasoning may apply if the animal is named as
the actual beneficiary of the trust because the animal could
not serve as a repository for the property's equitable title. A
traditional trust needs a beneficiary who has standing to en-
force the trustee's duties.99 Trusts that name animals directly
as beneficiaries lack this necessary element and thus may be
challenged on this basis.99
90. See generally BOWE & PARKER, supra note 89, § 17.21, at 851 ("If a di-
rect gift [for the care of particular animals] not upon trust were attempted, it is
certain that it would be held invalid .... ").
91. In re Estate of Russell, 444 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1968).
92. See id. at 355.
93. See id. at 356 (discussing how the trial court determined that the lan-
guage regarding Roxy Russell was merely precatory).
94. See id. at 363.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See Estate of Russell, 444 P.2d at 364.
98. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 112 (1957) ("A trust is
not created unless there is a beneficiary who is definitely ascertained at the
time of the creation of the trust or definitely ascertainable within the period of
the rule against perpetuities."); CAL. PROB. CODE § 15205(a) (West 1991) (pro-
viding that "[a] trust, other than a charitable trust, is created only if there is a
beneficiary").
99. See generally GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 165, at 160 (rev. 2d ed. 1979) (stating that it
would "seem impossible to approve a trust for specific animals as a private trust
because of the lack of a beneficiary capable of taking the equitable interest and
of enforcing the obligation of the trustee"); Schwartz, supra note 20, at 377.
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2. The Gift Is Not Charitable
Gifts for the benefit of an indefinite number of animals
are typically upheld and enforced as charitable gifts."' How-
ever, gifts for the care of specific animals do not benefit the
community in general and thus are consistently held to be
noncharitable."'0
3. The Gift Violates the Rule Against Perpetuities or a
Related Rule
An oft-cited reason for refusing to give effect to a gift for
the benefit of a pet animal is that the gift violates the rule
against perpetuities, or some similar common law or statu-
tory rule, because the duration of the trust is based on the life
of the animal rather than a human.0 2 The 1932 New York
case of In re Howells' Estate 1 3 demonstrates this analysis.
The pet owner directed that the residuary of her estate be
placed in trust and that a portion of the income be used "for
the care, comfort and maintenance of my pet animals as my
friends and co-teachers, Elera Burck and Milison Dutrow
shall direct and authorize." 4 The owner's will further pro-
vided that any part of the estate could be retained "to provide
100. See, e.g., In re Estate of Coleman, 138 P. 992 (Cal. 1914) (upholding the
decedent's gift of $30,000 to the city of Sacramento to be used to erect a fountain
"for the benefit of thirsty animals and birds"); Shannon v. Eno, 179 A. 479
(Conn. 1935) (upholding trust to create a cattery for the care of homeless ani-
mals); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 374 (1957).
101. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 99, § 379, at 199; 2 AUSTIN
WALKiAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 124.3, at 261 (4th ed. 1987); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-26-027 (Apr. 5, 1995) (denying
estate tax charitable deduction to trust created for the benefit of seven dogs and
cats).
102. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 374 cmt. h (1944).
The lives which can be used in measuring the permissible period under
which the rule against perpetuities must be lives of human beings....
[N]o such measurement may be expressed in terms of the life of any
animal (other than man), even though the animal is one of a type hav-
ing a life span typically shorter than that of human beings ....
Id.
103. In re Howells' Estate, 260 N.Y.S. 598 (Sur. Ct. 1932), modified, 261
N.Y.S. 859 (1933). For further discussion of this case, see Note, Validity of
Trusts in Favor of Animals, 42 YALE L.J. 1290 (1933); Note, Trusts-Purposes-
Validity of a Testamentary Trust For Benefit of Specific Animals, 17 MINN. L.
REV. 563 (1933) [hereinafter Validity of a Testamentary Trust For Benefit of
Specific Animals].
104. Howells'Estate, 260 N.Y.S. at 601.
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for the care of my pet animals while they live.""5 The court
focused on whether the gift for the lives of the owner's five
animals violated a local rule-against-perpetuities-like statute,
even though there was an additional human beneficiary who
was also entitled to distributions from her residuary estate.06
The applicable statute prohibited the suspension of owner-
ship of personal property for more than the duration of two
lives in being.0 7 The court avoided directly holding that
trusts may not be limited by the lives of animals. The trust
was for the benefit of five animals, thus exceeding the per-
missible number of measuring lives even if animals could be
treated as measuring lives.0 8 In dicta, however, the court
opined that it was probable that measuring lives needed to be
human.0 9 Because the gift for the benefit of the animals was
so intertwined with other provisions of the will, several of
which had additional problems, the pet owner was deemed to
die intestate with respect to her residuary estate."0
Subsequent New York courts seized on the Howells' Es-
tate dicta to frustrate the intent of other owners to care for
their pets."' In In re Mills' Estate,"' the pet owner directed
that her executor set aside enough property to earn at least
$100 per year to care for her pets until all of them died."1
The court determined that measuring lives must be human
and thus this provision of the pet owner's will failed."4 Like-
wise, the court in In re Filkin's Will"' voided a provision of
the pet owner's will that provided that a gift was contingent
on the beneficiary "furnishing proper care for any and all pets
which I may own at the time of my decease for as long as they
105. Id. at 602.
106. See id. at 604-05.
107. See id. at 606.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 606-07.
110. See Howells'Estate, 260 N.Y.S. at 609.
11L See generally Note, Bequests for the Care of Animals, 74 N.Y. L. REV.
430 (1940) (discussing development of New York case law by critiquing the case
of Estate of Baier, N.Y. L.J., July 13, 1940, at 101, which invalidated a gift for a
cat, Tommy Tucker, because the trust was not limited in duration to a human
life).
112. In re Mills' Estate, 111 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sur. Ct. 1952).
113. See id. at 624.
114 See id. at 625.
115. In re Filkins' Will, 120 N.Y.S.2d 124 (Sur. Ct. 1952).
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shall live."11 The court determined this condition subsequent
void as an "unlawful suspension of the power of alienation.""7
Thus, the beneficiary received the property unburdened by
the condition."8
4. Capricious Use of Funds Against Public Policy
Unhappy remainder beneficiaries and heirs could allege
that the use of property to care for specific animals is a capri-
cious use of funds and an inefficient use of valuable resources.
Consequently, they could urge that enforcement of arrange-
ments for the care of a pet after the owner's death are against
public policy and that the policy favoring freedom of property
disposition at death is counterbalanced by the desire to avoid
the frivolous use of property for animal care when the needs
of humans are considered more important. This argument
has not been popular. In fact, the author located no case
where this was the basis for a court holding that the gift for
the animal was ineffective."' There are, however, several in-
stances where courts determined that the pet owner left ex-
cessive funds for the care of the animal and reduced the gift
to a more reasonable amount.120
5. Other Disapproval Grounds
An owner's intent to care for a pet animal may be de-
feated for a variety of other reasons, often having their basis
in the owner's failure to select a proper legal mechanism to
116. Id. at 125.
117. Id. at 126.
118. See id.
119. See generally 2 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 101, at 244 (concluding
that even though there is no direct benefit to a living person, "it would seem
that there is nothing rising to the dignity of public policy to prevent the carrying
out of the [pet owner's] purpose"); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., The 1999 Joseph
Trachtman Lecture-Uniform Acts, Restatements and Other Trends in American
Trust Law at Century's End, 25 ACTEC NOTES 101, 107 (1999) (discussing trust
purposes that are contrary to public policy without mentioning trusts for the
care of specific animals).
120. See, e.g., In re Templeton Estate, 4 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. 2d 172, 175 (Or-
phans' Ct. 1984) (applying "inherent power to reduce the amount involved... to
an amount which is sufficient to accomplish [the owner's] purpose"); In re Lyon's
Estate, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 474, 482-83 (C.P. Orphans' Ct. 1974) (reducing the
amount left for the animal's care based on the supposition that the owner mis-
took how much money would be needed to care for the animals); see also UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c)(6) (1993) (authorizing the court to reduce amount if it
"substantially exceeds the amount required" to care for the animal).
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transfer funds for the benefit of the pet or the anticipated
caretaker. In Dailey v. Adams,'21 the pet owner wrote two
documents: a check to a friend and a separate document de-
tailing how the friend was to use the money.'22 These instruc-
tions included a direction that the friend "care for my dog
Madam Shan for her lifetime and beried [sic] in a pine box at
the foot of my grave."2 3 The owner delivered the check and
the instruction document to the friend. After the owner
died, the friend presented the check and the document as a
claim against the estate." The court determined that the
friend was not entitled to the money and thus could not carry
out the owner's intent regarding Madam Shan."' The court
held that the instruments did not create a contract because
the friend did not sign the document and there was no con-
sideration.'27 Further, the check did not operate as an inter
vivos gift because the friend neither cashed the check nor had
a right to the money; the pet owner could have placed a stop
payment order on the check.'28 Finally, the court rejected the
friend's claim that the check operated as a gift causa mortis
because the check was not given in contemplation of death.'29
The pet owner's intent may also go unfulfilled simply be-
cause no one expends sufficient effort to carry out the owner's
wishes. For example, in the case of In re Estate of McNeill,"'
the pet owner attempted to create a testamentary trust to
provide for her two dogs and one cat."' She entrusted the
care of the animals to named individuals and then provided
for twenty-five dollars per week to be paid on behalf of each
animal."2 The owner expressly stated that "[tihe primary
purpose of this Trust is to see that each of said pets is ade-
quately cared for, given proper veterinary attention and given
a decent burial at the time of their death."13' The trial court
121. Dailey v. Adams, 319 S.W.2d 34 (Ark. 1959).
122. See id. at 35-36.




127. See Dailey, 319 S.W.2d at 36.
128. See id. at 37.
129. See id. The pet owner lived 140 days after delivering the check. See id.
130. In re Estate of McNeill, 41 Cal. Rptr. 139 (Ct. App. 1964).





determined that the trust for the pets was void because it
violated the rule against perpetuities. The named caretak-
ers made no attempt to carry out the purpose of the owner's
trust; they did not even appeal the lower court's decision."
The case was appealed on other grounds and thus the appel-
late court would not consider the issue of the validity of the
trust because the appellant conceded that the trust was
void.13 The court went on to hold that the remainder interest
following the void gifts for the animals did not fail. Thus, the
remainder beneficiaries, various branches of the Society for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, were the proper recipi-
ents of the trust property.
1 37
C. Judicial Acquiescence
Some courts have been much kinder to pets and their
owners, permitting arrangements for the benefit of the ani-
mals to operate. This section reviews the grounds by which
those courts have acquiesced in gifts for the benefit of pets.
1. An Honorary Trust Not in Violation of the Rule
Against Perpetuities
A popular approach for upholding trusts for the benefit of
pet animals is for the court to deem them honorary trusts."
These trusts are not invalidated for violating the rule against
perpetuities, either through the use of creative legal reason-
ing or by limiting their duration to twenty-one years. For ex-
ample, the pet owner's will in the 1950 Ohio case of In re
Searight's Estate39 made the following gift:
134. See id. at 140-41.
135. See id. at 140.
136. See Estate of McNeill, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
137. See id. at 141-42.
138. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 99, § 166, at 163. An honorary trust
is defined as:
[A] noncharitable trust which has no ascertained or ascertainable bene-
ficiaries and so is not enforceable, but one in which the court permits
the trustee, if willing, to carry out the purposes of the trust, and re-
fuses to declare the trust void and to decree a resulting trust for the
successors of the settlor, as long as the trustee acts in accordance with
the terms of the gift.
Id.
139. In re Searights Estate, 95 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950). For addi-
tional discussion of this case, see William Clinton Tompkins, Note, Trusts-
Honorary Trust Doctrine-Application of Rule Against Perpetuities, 20 U. CIN.
L. REV. 434 (1951).
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I give and bequeath my dog, Trixie, to Florence Hand...
and I direct my executor to deposit in the Peoples Federal
Savings and Loan Association... the sum of $1000.00 to
be used by him to pay Florence Hand at the rate of 75
cents per day for the keep and care of my dog as long as it
shall live. If my dog shall die before the said $1000.00 and
the interest accruing therefrom shall have been used up, I
give and bequeath whatever remains [to remainder bene-
ficiaries].
14 °
Neither the probate court nor the beneficiaries of the will dis-
puted the validity of the gift." Instead, the Department of
Taxation of Ohio disputed the probate court's determination
that amounts passing to Trixie would not be subject to the in-
heritance tax and urged the court to invalidate of the gift in
order to collect additional taxes.
42
The court began its analysis by recognizing that a trust
cannot exist unless there is a beneficiary who has legal
standing to enforce the trust.' After examining a variety of
leading texts and the Restatement, the court adopted the
view that although the trust was unenforceable, the trans-
feree could voluntarily carry out the stated purpose.4
The court next addressed the Department of Taxation's
argument that the gift violated the rule against perpetui-
ties. 45 The court explained that pet owners could easily avoid
the perpetuities problems by basing the duration of their
trusts on human lives instead of animal lives, which could be
extremely long, especially if they were "crocodiles, elephants,
and sea turtles. 46 In the instant case, however, the pet
owner expressly provided for the trust to exist for Trixie's life-
time. 147 Is Trixie out of luck?
REV. 434 (1951).
140. Searight's Estate, 95 N.E.2d at 780.
141. See id. (holding that Trixie "inherits the sum of $1000.00 with power to
consume both the interest and principal at a limited rate" and indicating that
the executor was carrying out the provisions of the will).
142. See id. at 781. The Department of Taxation wanted to collect inheri-
tance tax on the amounts expended for the benefit of Trixie. The probate court
determined that Trixie was not a person and thus not subject to the tax. The
appellate court affirmed. See id. at 783-84.
143. See id. at 781.
144. See id. at 782.
145. See id.
146. Searight's Estate, 95 N.E.2d at 783.
147. See id. at 780.
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The court skirted the rule against perpetuities problem
by looking at the exact terms of the gift."8 The $1000 was
payable at the rate of seventy-five cents per day, which would
mean that the money-even if it earned a high rate of inter-
est-would not last more than four years and two months. "9
The court then concluded that the pet owner did provide an
ascertainable time limit which was considerably less than the
twenty-one years allowed under the rule against perpetui-
ties.1
50
A series of three Pennsylvania cases adopted a simpler
analysis, beginning with the Lyon's Estate5' case in 1974.
The animal owner's will contained the following provision:
It is my expressed direction that all dogs and horses upon
the farm at the time of my death, shall be kept there and
cared for until their deaths. To enable my Executor to
carry out this provision I authorize him to use any of the
principal or income from my estate as may be required to
properly maintain and operate my farms and in his sole
discretion, if he deems necessary, I direct that the pay-
ment of any of the above bequests be postponed, without
interest.
52
The court was called upon to determine the validity of this
provision. Specifically, the court addressed whether all of the
property in the estate was needed for this purpose because
the income of $40,000 to $50,000 exceeded the amount neces-
sary to care for four horses and the five remaining dogs. 5'
The court began its analysis by recognizing that the ani-
mal owner did not create a traditional trust because no legal
entity holding a beneficial interest with standing to enforce
the trust existed."M However, the court then discussed the
Restatement of Trusts and concluded that it is "reasonable" to
permit honorary trusts because they give effect to the intent
of the animal owner.'55
148. See id. at 783.
149. See id. (explaining that without factoring in interest, the money would
last three years and 238 days and that even assuming a 6% interest rate on
the unused balance, the money would run out after four years and 57 days).
150. See id.
151. In re Lyon's Estate, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 474 (C.P. Orphans' Ct. 1974).
152. Id. at 475n 1.
153. See id. at 477.
154. See id. at 478.
155. See id. The court especially supported honorary trusts where, as in this
case, the trustees were willing to comply with the pet owner's desires. See id.
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The court then dealt with the rule against perpetuities
problem, because the duration of the honorary trust was
pegged to the lives of the animals.' Without providing a de-
tailed explanation, the court simply limited the duration of
the trust to twenty-one years.'57 The court then concluded
that the amount available for the animals was "patently un-
supportable" and thus reduced the amount based on the sup-
position that the animal owner mistook how much money was
needed to care for the animals.'58 Finally, the court permitted
the remainder beneficiary to take the excess amount immedi-
ately, rather than waiting until all the animals died.'59
A similar approach was used in the Hackett Estate" case.
The pet owner left $5,000 to a veterinarian with the stipula-
tion that the income and principal be used "for the mainte-
nance and care of the animals I leave behind." 6' The veteri-
narian agreed to carry out these provisions, but one of the
remainder beneficiaries asserted that the trust was invalid
because it violated the rule against perpetuities and lacked a
beneficiary with standing to enforce the trust.'62 Without
analysis, the court simply concluded that "[a]lthough not
technically an enforceable trust, since the [veterinarian] is
willing to hold the property for the designated purpose, the
property may be so held, and the rule against perpetuities is
not violated." 6' The court then gave the veterinarian two op-
tions. First, he could enter into an agreement with the cur-
rent possessor of the animals, or another responsible person,
for the care of the animals as long as the term of the agree-
ment did not exceed twenty-one years." Second, the veteri-
narian could enter into an agreement for the care of the ani-
mals with an animal hospital, who would then receive the
entire gift as dictated by the owner's will."
156. See id. at 479.
157. See Lyon's Estate, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d at 483.
158. See id. at 482-83 (providing various options for the trustee to carry out
the owner's intent and the court's judgment).
159. See id. at 483.
160. In re Hackett Estate, 30 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. 237 (Orphans' Ct. 1979).
161 Id. at 237.
162. See id. at 238.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 239.
165. See id. at 239-40.
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The third Pennsylvania case in this series is Templeton
Estate,'166 decided in 1984. The pet owner left one-eighth of
her estate to care for her pet cats, Caliph and Honeydew.'67
The court determined that the owner intended to create a
trust for the cats, although she never actually used trust lan-
guage."6 The court recognized the wide variety of approaches
courts have adopted when dealing with trusts for the benefit
of animals, concluding that the appropriate resolution is
highly dependent on the exact language the pet owner used in
the will.'69 The court determined that this cat owner intended
to create an honorary trust.' Because the amount the owner
left to the trust was excessive, the court used its "inherent
power to reduce the amount involved.., to an amount which
is sufficient to accomplish [the owner's] purpose."7' The court
consequently set aside $25,000 to be used for the life of the
cats, but in no event longer than twenty-one years.72
A Florida court followed a similar approach in the 1998
case of Phillips v. Estate of Holzmann.7' Phillips concerned a
pet owner whose will left $25,000 to a friend for the care and
shelter of two dogs, Riley and Shaun." Shortly after their
owner died, both Riley and Shaun were euthanized because of
their medical problems. 5 A dispute arose regarding the dis-
tribution of the money--did it belong to the friend or did it re-
turn to the owner's estate?76 Both the trial and appellate
courts held that the pet owner created an honorary trust and
adopted the Restatement of Trusts' position that the trans-
feree may use the property for the pets, although such use
cannot be enforced.'77 The transferee could no longer use the
money for the pets because they were dead; thus, all remain-
ing funds returned to the estate under a resulting trust.7 8
166. In re Templeton Estate, 4 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. 2d 172 (Orphans' Ct. 1984).
167. See id. at 173.
168. See id. at 174.
169. See id. (detailing three approaches: the honorary trust, the conditional
gift, and the outright unconditional gift to the caretaker).
170. See id.
17L Id. at 175.
172. See Templeton Estate, 4 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. 2d at 175.
173. Phillips v. Estate of Holzmann, 740 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
174. See id. at 2.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 3.
178. See id.
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2. Owner's Instructions Deemed Precatory
Some courts effectuate the owner's intent to a limited ex-
tent by ignoring restrictions on the gift, which the owner in-
tended to benefit the pet, by deeming the language precatory.
Precatory language is not binding and does not impose an en-
forceable condition on the beneficiary's use of the property.
Although this is not in keeping with the owner's actual in-
tent, it at least prevents the gift from failing altogether by
granting the property to the person who was to care for the
animal. If this person is of high moral character, he or she
will then use the property as the owner requested to care for
the pet.
The Supreme Court of Colorado followed this approach in
the 1929 case of In re Forrester's Estate.' The pet owner's
will left the bulk of his estate for the relief of hungry, thirsty,
abused, and neglected cattle, horses, dogs, and cats.18 In ad-
dition, the owner "especially request[ed] that my dog Shep (if
living) be given every care and a good home during his life
and a decent burial upon his passing."18 The distant heirs
who were contesting the will asserted that this provision in-
validated the entire charitable gift because it singled out a
particular animal. 8' The court held that the statements re-
garding Shep "were merely precatory words," 8' thus the
charitable gift was effective."'
The 1936 Washington case of In re Bradley's Estate8'
dealt with a pet owner's will containing a residuary clause
that stated the beneficiary "must take good care of my dear
179. Johnston v. Colorado State Bureau of Child & Animal Protection (In re
Forrester's Estate), 279 P. 721 (Colo. 1929).
180. See id. at 722.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 724.
183. Id. The court further stated that:
The request for the dog Shep was the expression of a wish, a hope on
behalf of a possibly homeless dog for care and attention, and was not
intended to modify, cut down, or nullify the gift of all the residuary es-
tate to the [charity], for the relief of abused and neglected cattle,
horses, dogs, and cats. The words were precatory.
Id.
184. See id. The court noted that Shep would fall within the broad class of
dogs to be benefited by the will because he would probably be a homeless dog
after the owner's death. See id.
185. Gale v. Graham (In re Bradley's Estate), 59 P.2d 1129 (Wash. 1936).
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cats, Sister, Daddy Bimbow, Jimmy John and Tricksey."88
The pet owner's heirs actually wanted this provision to create
a mandatory trust for the cats.'87 The motivation for this po-
sition was likely that the heirs would be entitled either to (1)
all the property because the trust was invalid, or (2) the re-
maining property after the death of the cats. The court re-
jected the argument that the pet owner established a trust,
and thus did not have to rule on the validity of a trust for the
benefit of pet animals. Instead, the court held the language
precatory, because
no one could reasonably say that it was the intent of the
[pet owner] that the entire residue of the estate should be
expended for the benefit of cats alone .... [T]he [pet
owner] relied upon her dear friend and companion to com-
ply with her request, or command, to care for the pets.188
The case report does not mention whether the beneficiary was
actually caring for the pets as the owner intended.
A similar result was reached in the 1948 Pennsylvania
case of In re Renner's Estate.'89 The pet owner's will left the
residue of her estate in trust for the maintenance of her dog
and parrot, and for their interment in a named cemetery
upon their deaths.90 The court ignored the pet owner's at-
tempted creation of a trust, concluding that the gift was out-
right and the intended trustee became the outright owner of
the residuary estate.' 9' The court considered the pet language
as being merely expressive of the owner's wishes, imposing no
restriction or condition.'92 The court recognized that the will
could be interpreted as raising honorary trust and rule
against perpetuities issues, but determined that no discussion
of these matters was required because of the court's determi-
nation that the pet care language was of no effect.'93 The
court did not indicate whether the dog and the parrot were
receiving proper care.
186. Id. at 1131 (emphasis in original).
187. See id.
188. Id.
189. In re Renner's Estate, 57 A.2d 836 (Pa. 1948). For further discussion of
this case, see Thomas Park Shearer, Note, Wills-Honorary Trusts-Rule
Against Perpetuities, 10 U. Prf. L. REV. 102 (1948).
190. See Renner's Estate, 57 A.2d at 837.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 838.
193. See id.
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The 1950 New York case of In re Johnston's Estate... is
also instructive. The owner's will provided that the benefici-
ary was to receive her horses, Bessie and Daisy, along with
$14,000.9' She then continued by stating that it was her
"wish and direction" that the money and its income be used
for "the care and maintenance" of Bessie and Daisy.196 Before
she died, however, the horses were sold and thus the bequest
adeemed."' The court nonetheless allowed the beneficiary to
take the $14,000, deeming the phrase "wish and direction" to
be "precatory rather than mandatory in nature." 98 Although
Bessie and Daisy did not benefit from the court's interpreta-
tion, it is clear that if the horses had still been in the estate,
the beneficiary would have received the money and could
then carry out the owner's intent by using the money for Bes-
sie and Daisy's care.
A Colorado court reached a similar result in the case of In
re Estate of Erl.'99 The pet owner's will gave $5,000 to an em-
ployee "for the proper care of my dog Dutchess."" ° The owner
had Dutchess euthanized more than one year before she
died."' The lower court determined that the employee's gift
was subject to a condition precedent, which failed because it
was impossible to perform. ' The court cited In re Johnston's
Estate and concluded that the impossibility did not defeat the
gift, but rather merely discharged the condition.0 3
194. In re Johnston's Estate, 99 N.Y.S.2d 219 (App. Div. 1950), affd, In re
Johnston's Will, 98 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1951).
195. See Johnston's Estate, 99 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
196. See id. at 221-22.
197. See id. at 222.
198. Id. at 223.
No doubt [the pet owner] was motivated by a desire to insure a good
home for her horses, and no doubt she expected her friend to utilize so
much of the gift as he might deem necessary for that purpose, but no-
where did she indicate that the gift was made on condition that he do
so or that what he might receive would be taken from him if the horses
died or if he found it necessary to dispose of them the very day he re-
ceived the bequest.
Id.
199. In re Estate of Erl, 491 P.2d 108 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
200. Id. at 108.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 109. The court did not hold that the language regarding
Dutchess was precatory, but likewise it did not expressly hold that the language
created a condition. See id.
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A court's seeming acquiescence in a gift in favor of a pet
animal by deeming the restrictive language precatory does
not always work to the pet's benefit. The pet owner in the
case of In re Bloch2°4 left property to certain individuals and
indicated that they had "agreed to care for my dog and cats
for as long as said shall live.""0 5 These individuals made no
attempt to care for the animals, yet claimed the property.
2 6
The court studied the will and determined that the language
regarding the animals did not impose a condition on the
gift."7 The court also rejected the argument that the benefici-
aries were contractually bound to care for the animals by in-
terpreting the term "agreed" as reflecting merely the pet
owner's motivation for making the gift.2 8 Accordingly, the
beneficiaries received the property, although they did not care
for the animals as the pet owner intended.0 9
3. Gift for a Humane Purpose
The landmark 1923 Kentucky case of Willett v. Willett,
210
the first reported case in the United States addressing a gift
for the benefit of a pet animal, 21 held that a testamentary gift
to care for a specific animal was a humane purpose. Thus,
the court allowed the gift under local statutory law validating
gifts for humane purposes. The relevant provision of the pet
owner's will reads as follows:
[One thousand dollars], which is to be used for the support
of our dog "Dick," if the interest is not sufficient for him to
be kept in comfort, that is being well fed, have a bed in the
house by a fire and treated well every day, that the princi-
pal be used to such a sum so it will last his lifetime....
204. In re Bloch, 625 A.2d 57 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
205. Id. at 59.
206. See id. at 61.
207. See id. The court was persuaded to take this approach because the pet
owner made other gifts that were clearly conditional, showing that the owner
knew how to impose conditions if she so desired, and the fact that intestacy
would result if the provision were deemed ineffective. See id. at 61-62.
208. See id. at 62.
209. See id. If these individuals did not receive the property, it would have
passed via intestacy to family members whom she did not want to share in her
estate. See id. Thus, the court actually carried out the pet owner's intent to
disinherit these family members, which was likely to be stronger than her in-
tent to provide care for the animals.
210. Willett v. Willett, 247 S.W. 739, 741 (Ky. 1923). For further discussion
of this case, see Validity of Bequest, supra note 66.
211. See Validity of Bequest, supra note 66.
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Dicky must have three meals daily.212
The lower court refused to give effect to the gift for Dick's
benefit.213 On appeal, two arguments were raised against the
validity of this gift. First, the owner failed to name a trus-
tee.214 The appellate court rejected this argument quickly by
citing the long established rule that "equity never allows a
trust to fail for want of a trustee."2 Second, a dog cannot be
the recipient of a testamentary gift.216 The appellate court be-
gan its analysis of this issue by interpreting the will as es-
tablishing a trust with a $1000 corpus for Dick.21" Dick's sup-
port was to come from the interest generated from this fund,
but the principal could be used if necessary.218 Accordingly,
the pet owner did not make a gift directly to the pet, but in-
stead for the pet's use and benefit. 219 The court recognized
that the pet owner's gift was not charitable in nature because
it was directed to one animal rather than to a sufficiently
large class.220 By statute, however, Kentucky validated gifts
for any "humane purpose."21 The court determined that tak-
ing care of Dick was a humane purpose, citing a variety of
sources that defined the word humane" as including the kind
and compassionate treatment of animals. 22 Accordingly, the
gift for Dick's benefit was effective. 3
4. Gift Coupled with a Power
A court may view a gift for the benefit of a pet animal as
actually being a gift to the human donee that is coupled with
the grant of a power to appoint the property for the animals'
benefit.224 As with the honorary trust approach, treating the
212. Willett, 247 S.W. at 739.





218. See Willett, 247 S.W. at 740.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. KY. STAT. § 317 (1966) (current version at KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 381.260 (Banks-Baldwin 1999)).
222. See Willett, 247 S.W. at 740.
223. See id. at 741. The pet owner neglected to provide for the distribution of
the remaining trust property upon Dick's death. This property would pass
through intestate succession. See id.
224. See In re Searight's Estate, 95 N.E.2d 779, 782 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950).
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gift as coupled with a power of appointment does not make
the arrangement enforceable; the donee may use the property
for purposes other than the animal's care.2" It does, however,
eliminate rule against perpetuities problems because the only
person who could exercise the power of appointment would be
the donee and that power would end upon the donee's
death.
22 6
5. Conditional Gift to an Individual
The pet owner may make the gift for the pet's benefit di-
rectly to a human beneficiary, but condition that gift on tak-
ing proper care of the pet. The pet owner in the Kieffer Es-
tate22 case left her entire estate to a niece "to be used for GiGi
and Diedrie two poodles to be used to take care of them and
their puppies born up to the present time."29 The court de-
termined that the pet owner gave her entire estate to the
niece subject to the condition that she take care of the dogs." °
The niece was in the process of filfilling the condition; thus,
the court awarded her the pet owner's estate.23'
The pet owner in the case of In re Meyer's Will' 2 set aside
$2000 in her will for the care of Ollie, a cat. 3 The owner di-
rected the executor to distribute $500 each year to the care-
taker until the money was exhausted or the cat died, with any
balance then passing to the caretaker.2' Ollie died within a
The court did not, however, provide an analysis of this theory and instead based
its decision on the application of the honorary trust doctrine. See id.
225. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 cmt. d (1984) ("Words
which merely express a suggestion or wish or desire that a transferee of prop-
erty will make a certain disposition thereof do not, in the absence of other cir-
cumstances, cause the transfer to be less than it would be without the precatory
words.").
226. See Tompkins, supra note 139, at 434 n.1.
227. In addition to the cases discussed in this section, see In re Murray's Es-
tate, 99 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sur. Ct. 1948) (construing a gift for the care of the owner's
Angora cat as conditional and rejecting the assertion that the pet owner was
attempting to create a trust that would violate the rule against perpetuities be-
cause the measuring life was non-human).
228. In re Kieffer Estate, 21 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. 406 (Orphans' Ct. 1971).
229. Id. at 406.
230. See id. at 407.
23L See id. (noting that the owner's other heirs did not attempt to invalidate
the gift and stating that "it is refreshing to note the expressions of forbearance
by some of those who would benefit by an intestacy").
232. In re Meyer's Will, 236 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sur. Ct. 1962).
233. See id. at 13.
234. See id.
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few hours of his owner." The court determined that the gift
to the caretaker was not conditioned on caring for Ollie, and
thus the validity of the limitation was not actually in issue. 6
However, in dicta, the court indicated that the will was sub-
ject to the interpretation that the owner imposed a condition
subsequent so that the caretaker would be entitled to the
money unless she failed to look after Ollie."7
In re Andrews' Will 8 is a similar case in which the pet
owner conditioned a $500 legacy on the beneficiary giving her
dog "good care as long as the dog lives."239 The dog died prior
to the owner's death, so the court needed to determine if the
beneficiary would still receive the legacy.24 The court con-
cluded that the pet owner imposed a condition subsequent,
that is, the legacy would vest in the beneficiary but would be
divested if she did not care for the dog.241 The owner did not
limit the gift by providing that it was to occur only if the dog
was alive at her death, therefore, the beneficiary received the
legacy."2
6. Unchallenged or Issue Not Reached
Many reported cases discuss wills and trusts containing
gifts for the benefit of pet animals but do not actually decide
the validity of those gifts, either because no one challenges
the gift or the issue is not reached for any of a variety of rea-
sons." For example, in Richberg v. Robbins,2" the pet owner
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 14.
238. In re Andrews' Will, 228 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Sur. Ct. 1962).
239. Id. at 592.
240. See id. at 593.
24L See id. at 594.
242. See id.
243. In addition to the cases discussed in this section, see Mack v. Ritten-
house, 173 S.W.2d 1002, 1003 n.1 (Ark. 1943) (quoting pet owner's will which
included a provision for the care of her dog, Ruffles, and set aside $500 for the
dog's care to be paid at the rate of $100 per year); In re Estate of Thomason, 54
Cal. Rptr. 229, 230 (1966) (mentioning that pet owner's will contained a sub-
stantial bequest for the care of a dog); In re Heard's Estate, 319 P.2d 637, 638
(Cal. 1957) (referencing pet owner's will which established a trust to pay, among
other things, $25 per month for the care of a dog); In re Hart's Estate, 311 P.2d
605, 614 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (avoiding issue of whether gift requiring
charitable beneficiary to permit pet owner's animals to remain on the devised
land and be fed and cared for at all times by deeming the provision severable
and thus, even if the provision were invalid, it would not invalidate the will);
Succession of Moffat, 577 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (reporting that
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left two instruments of potentially testamentary character.
The earlier instrument left all of the pet owner's property di-
rectly to Dixie, his female pit bull, with the direction that $40
be spent each month for Dixie's care."5 Several months later,
the pet owner drafted another instrument leaving $4,500 for
Dixie's benefit at the lower rate of $35 per month. 6 The
court sidestepped the issue of whether either gift was effec-
tive because issues of will construction were not proper in the
lower court.4 However, the court did favorably reference
authority supporting private trusts for the care of specific
animals. 48 Although not discussed in the case, a pet owner's
specification of monthly payments may be successful in de-
feating a contest based on the rule against perpetuities prob-
lem where the money would run out well before twenty-one
years elapses. 9
pet owner's will provided that certain property be used for the "care of my three
dogs and board them in a veterinary hospital for the remainder of the life of the
dogs"); New England Trust Co. v. Folsom, 167 N.E. 665, 666 (Mass. 1929)
(holding that gift in trust "for the boarding during their respective lifetimes of
such cats as may be owned by me at the time of my decease" not "of itself evi-
dence of lack of testamentary capacity"); Greenwood v. Henry, 28 A. 1053, 1056,
1058 (N.J. Ch. 1894) (using fact that the will contained provisions for Jenny
(horse), Dasey (cow), Fox (dog), and Rover (dog) as evidence that the will was
not a forgery because a forger would not have included "such foolish provi-
sions"); In re Richter's Will, 82 P.2d 916, 918 (N.M. 1938) (avoiding considera-
tion of validity of pet owner's trust for the care of a dog because the dog died
prior to trial); In re Goodwin's Estate, 66 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sur. Ct. 1946) (deter-
mining that funds the owner left "to be used for the care of my two pet dogs,
'Sweetie' and 'Man" passed to the designated remainder beneficiaries because
the dogs died during the owner's lifetime); In re Maeder Estate, 19 Pa. Fiduc.
Rep. 374 (Orphans' Ct. 1968) (recognizing a testamentary trust containing
$6000 with the income and principal to be used for Rusty, the pet owner's dog,
for Rusty's maintenance, support, and care); Connor v. Connor, No. 83-1535,
1984 WL 180687 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1984) (indicating that pet owner's will
established a trust for her cats and impliedly assuming its validity). See gener-
ally BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 99, § 165, at 159 ("Usually the amount given
is small and the next of kin of the testator, or his residuary legatees, raise no
question as to the validity of the gift and trustee applies the property as di-
rected.").
244. Richberg v. Robbins, 228 S.W.2d 1019 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950). For fur-
ther discussion of this case, see Wills-Providing for Care of Specific Animals,
supra note 89.
245. See Richberg, 228 S.W.2d at 1020.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 1021.
248. See id.
249. Without considering interest, the money would run out in under eleven
years. See In re Searight's Estate, 95 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950)
(using pay out schedule for pet's benefit to show pet owner's intent to limit du-
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In the case of Matter of Rogers,25 the pet owner directed
her executor to make arrangements for the permanent care of
his two thoroughbred dogs, a chow and a weimaraner. The
owner granted the executor the discretion to determine the
amount of funds to be paid.251 The executor, who was also the
attorney who drafted the will, eagerly made arrangements for
the care of the animals after the owner's death. There was no
dispute regarding the validity of the gift. Instead, the case
focused on the propriety of the executor's expenditures and
whether they were so unreasonable and unnecessary that the
executor should be suspended from the practice of law.252
The court examined a variety of the executor's expenses,
such as $300 per month payments to the executor's son to
care for one of the dogs, a fence on the son's property to keep
the dog in the yard, a dog house, the purchase of a car for
over $5,000 to transport the dog from place to place, and the
purchase of a washing machine to launder the dog's bed
clothing.5 ' The court determined that it was a matter of
opinion whether most of these expenditures were appropri-
ate.u4 However, the court found that the purchase of a car to
give the dog rides to rural areas and to purchase dog food was
excessive.255 There was testimony showing that the car was
also used for other purposes, such as to go on family picnics
and take vacations." 6 The court concluded that the executor's
attempt to get paid for all of these items was not a reasonable
exercise of his fiduciary dutiesY Accordingly, the court sus-
pended the executor from the practice of law for sixty days.
258
The pet owner's will in Betts v. Snyder"s provided that
various devises of life estates were subject to the support of
Charlie, a horse, and required that Charlie be kindly
ration of trust).
250. Matter of Rogers, 412 P.2d 710 (Ariz. 1966).
251. See id. at 711.
252. See id.
253. See id. at 710-11.
254. See id. at 713.
255. See id. at 714 (quoting testimony of the executor's son claiming that a
new car was necessary because in the old car, "the thing could drool over the
seat right onto you" and "the dog was just so affectionate it would start licking
you and... before you knew it you'd have it up there").
256. See Matter of Rogers, 412 P.2d at 714.
257. See id. at 715.
258. See id.
259. Betts v. Snyder, 19 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1941).
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treated."' The court did not directly rule on the effectiveness
of this provision because no one contested its validity on the
basis of it being in favor of an animal.26'
The pet owner's will in In re Flynn's Estate262 provided for
a trustee to use the income from $1000 for the care of her pet
dog and for the remainder to pass as part of another trust
created in her will.2 " Although the validity of the trust was
not at issue, the court noted that the trustee paid five dollars
per month for the care of the dog and gave no indication that
the trustee's conduct was inappropriate."
7. Other Tacit Approvals
Courts have also approved gifts for the benefit of pet
animals without actually stating a legal basis for the ap-
proval." In the case of In re Estate of Hampton,26 the pet
owner's will directed that a named beneficiary was to "take
what he wants and take care of the cat."267 The beneficiary
urged that this provision entitled him to select any or all of
the pet owner's estate as long as he agreed to care for the
cat.26 8 The court rejected this argument, deciding that the pet
owner intended for the cat to have a good home and wanted
the beneficiary "to be compensated for undertaking the re-
sponsibility of caring for her cat by providing that he should
have, in addition to any paraphernalia for the cat, something
that he might want for himself as a token of her appreciation
and regard."
2 69
260. See id. at 83.
261. Likewise, in the case of In re Brown's Estate, 69 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866 (Sur.
Ct. 1947), the court did not need to rule on the validity of a gift of $25 per month
to a pet owner's employee, provided she care for the owner's dogs, because the
employee expressly renounced the gift. See id. at 866.
262. In re Flynn's Estate, 67 S.W.2d 771 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934).
263. See id. at 773.
264. See id.
265. See also Martin v. Turner, 218 S.E.2d 789 (Ga. 1975) (affirming lower
court's determination that the pet owner breached an oral contract in which the
owner promised to provide for a certain individual in his will if she would care
for the owner and the owner's dog).
266. In re Estate of Hampton, 331 P.2d 778 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
267. Id. at 778.
268. See id. at 780.
269. Id. at 781.
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D. Statutory Authorization
The rapidly growing movement to recognize animal
trusts is reflected in legislation enacted over the past decade.
This section discusses the approach adopted by the Uniform
Probate Code, which is followed by several states, as well as
the approaches taken by other state legislatures.
1. Uniform Probate Code
The acceptability of trusts for the benefit of pet animals
took a tremendous stride forward when the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws added sec-
tion 2-90770 to the Uniform Probate Code in 1990. Section 2-
907 recognizes the "concern of many pet owners by providing
them a means for leaving funds to be used for the pet's
care."27' In a move designed to enhance the acceptance of
trusts for pet animals, the Commissioners elected to treat
trusts for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal
separately from trusts for all other lawful noncharitable pur-
poses (i.e., honorary trusts).72 This specific grant of validity
and enforceability to trusts for pets makes it clear that a pet
owner who lives in a state enacting section 2-907 may effec-
tuate his or her desire to make arrangements for the care of
pets upon death. Because the recognition of enforceable hon-
orary trusts and trusts for animals may be considered too un-
traditional or radical for some states considering the enact-
ment of the Uniform Probate Code, the Commissioners
labeled the section as an "optional provision."273 The workings
of both the original 1990 version and the revised 1993 version
are discussed below.
270. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907 (amended 1993). For an extensive discus-
sion of the development of section 2-907, see Adam J. Hirsch, Trusts for Pur-
poses: Policy, Ambiguity, and Anomaly in the Uniform Laws, 26 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 913 (1999).
271. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907 cmt.
272. See id. (noting that subsection (a) addresses honorary trusts in general
and subsection (b) singles out trusts for animals); Hirsch, supra note 270, at 924
n.56 (concluding that "emphasis on pets stemmed in part from the fact that the
Commissioners had received a thoughtful proposal on the subject and hence
were prompted to give it consideration").




The original version of section 2-907274 validates trusts for
274. The text of the 1990 version of section 2-907 reads as follows:
(a) [Honorary Trust.] A trust for a noncharitable corporation or unin-
corporated society or for a lawful noncharitable purpose may be per-
formed by the trustee for [21] years but no longer, whether or not there
is a beneficiary who can seek the trust's enforcement or termination
and whether or not the terms of the trust contemplate a longer dura-
tion.
(b) [Trust for Pets.] Subject to this subsection, a trust for the care of a
designated domestic or pet animal and the animal's offspring is valid.
Except as expressly provided otherwise in the trust instrument:
(1) No portion of the principal or income may be converted to the
use of the trustee or to any use other than for the benefit of a cov-
ered animal.
(2) The trust terminates at the earlier of [21] years after the trust
was created or when no living animal is covered by the trust.
(3) Upon termination, the trustee shall transfer the unexpended
trust property in the following order:
i) as directed in the trust instrument;
(ii) if the trust was created in a nonresiduary clause in the
transferor's will or in a codicil to the transferor's will, under
the residuary clause in the transferor's will; and
(iii) if no taker is produced by the application of subparagraph
(i) or (ii), to the transferor's heirs under Section 2-711.
(4) For the purposes of Section 2-707, the residuary clause is
treated as creating a future interest under the terms of a trust.
(5) The intended use of the principal or income can be enforced by
an individual designated for that purpose in the trust instrument
or, if none, by an individual appointed by a court upon application
to it by an individual.
(6) Except as ordered by the court or required by the trust instru-
ment, no filing, report, registration, periodic accounting, separate
maintenance of funds, appointment, or fee is required by reason of
the existence of the fiduciary relationship of the trustee.
(7) A governing instrument must be liberally construed to bring
the transfer within this section, to presume against the merely
precatory or honorary nature of the disposition, and to carry out
the general intent of the transferor. Extrinsic evidence is admissi-
ble in determining the transferor's intent.
(8) A court may reduce the amount of the property transferred, if it
determines that that amount substantially exceeds the amount re-
quired for the intended use. The amount of the reduction, if any,
passes as unexpended trust property under subsection (b)(3).
(9) If no trustee is designated or no designated trustee is willing or
able to serve, a court shall name a trustee. A court may order the
transfer of the property to another trustee, if required to assure
that the intended use is carried out and if no successor trustee is
designated in the trust instrument or if no designated successor
trustee agrees to serve or is able to serve. A court may also make
such other orders and determinations as shall be advisable to carry
out the intent of the transferor and the purpose of this section.
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"the care of a designated domestic or pet animal and the ani-
mal's offspring."275 The trustee is prohibited from using any of
the principal or income of the trust for any use other than the
benefit of the covered animal."6 In addition, and of tremen-
dous importance, is the fact that the trust is made enforce-
able.277 The pet owner is authorized to designate a person
with the power to enforce the trust, that is, to make certain
the trustee is using the principal and income for the benefit of
the pet.278 If the pet owner does not name an enforcer, any
individual may ask the court to appoint an enforcer. 9
The section pays homage to the rule against perpetuities
by mandating that the trust terminate "at the earlier of
[twenty-one] years after the trust was created or when no
living animal is covered by the trust."8 ' For owners of dogs
and cats, this limitation is of little importance because cats
and dogs rarely live beyond age twenty-one.281 However, own-
ers of long-lived animals, such as horses, elephants, and tor-





276. See id. § 2-907(b)(1).
277. See id. § 2-907(b)(5).
278. See id.
279. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(b)(5).
280. Id. The comment states that a state legislature may select any time pe-
riod it feels appropriate. See id. cmt.
28L See Funk & Wagnalls, Encyclopedia: Cat, Domestic (visited Feb. 11,
2000) <http//www.funkandwagnalls.com/encyclopedia/getpage.asp?book=
FWENCOline&abspage=/articles/004000b/004000991.asp> (stating that "[tihe
life span of the cat is about 15 years"); Funk & Wagnalls, Encyclopedia: Dog,
Domestic (visited Feb. 11, 2000) <http-//www.funkandwagnalls.com/ encyclope-
dia/getpage.asp?abspage=/articles/006001a/00600103 3 .asp> (reporting that dogs
"generally live to be 12 or 13 years old").
282. See Encyclopmdia Britannica, Mammal (visited Feb. 8, 2000)
<http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/5/0,5716,108385+9,00.html> (re-
porting that horses may live 60 years and elephants over 80 years); California
Turtle & Tortoise Club, Care of Desert Tortoises (visited Feb. 8, 2000)
<http'l/www.tortoise.org/general/descare.html> (reporting that desert tortoises
may live longer than 80 years). The comment recognizes the possibility of long-
lived animals and indicates that a state legislature may modify the provision to
provide for trust termination at the death of the animal. See UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-907 cmt. (amended 1993). If this change is made, the comment rec-
ommends that the language permitting a trust for an animal's offspring be
omitted. See id. As discussed in the next section, this is what the Commission-
ers actually did when they amended the section in 1993. See infra Part
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An owner must be leery about providing too much prop-
erty for the pet's care. The court may reduce the amount of
property transferred to the trust if it determines that the
amount substantially exceeds what is required for the care of
the animal.' The excess property passes first to the remain-
der beneficiaries of the trust; second, if no remainder benefi-
ciary exists, to the residuary beneficiary via the residuary
clause of the pet owner's will; and finally, if no taker has yet
been determined, to the owner's heirs via intestacy.2"
The administrative responsibilities of a trustee of a trust
for a pet animal are significantly reduced. Unless the trust or
the court otherwise requires, "no filing, report, registration,
periodic accounting, separate maintenance of funds, appoint-
ment, or fee is required by reason of the existence of the fidu-
ciary relationship of the trustee."" These lessened standards
alleviate many of the burdens associated with serving as a
trustee, thus encouraging the individual named as trustee to
accept the trust and effectuate the owner's intent. Of course,
there remains a risk that the trustee will improperly use the
trust property, but the owner may appoint an enforcer, as al-
ready discussed, to keep a watchful eye on the trustee.
The statute provides construction rules to increase the
likelihood that the pet owner's intent will be effectuated.
Courts must liberally construe the trust to bring it within the
purview of the statute and to carry out the pet owner's gen-
eral intent . The statute establishes a presumption against
the disposition being "merely precatory or honorary.""7 In
addition, extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine the pet
owner's intent.'
The pet owner's intent will not fail merely because the
pet owner failed to name a trustee or the named trustee is
unwilling or unable to serve. The court must appoint a trus-
tee. 9 The court may also make any other orders and deter-
minations necessary to carry out the pet owner's intent.290
283. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(b)(8).
284. See id. § 2-907(b)(8) & (b)(3).
285. Id. § 2-907(b)(6).
286. See id. § 2-907(b)(7).
287. Id.
288. See id.
289. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(b)(9).
290. See id.
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b. 1993 Version
Three years after its original enactment, the Commis-
sioners amended section 2-907.29I Most of the changes were
291. The text of the 1993 version of section 2-907 reads as follows:
(a) [Honorary Trust.] Subject to subsection (c), if (i) a trust is for a spe-
cific lawful noncharitable purpose or for lawful noncharitable purposes
to be selected by the trustee and (ii) there is no definite or definitely as-
certainable beneficiary designated, the trust may be performed by the
trustee for [21] years but no longer, whether or not the terms of the
trust contemplate a longer duration.
(b) [Trust for Pets.] Subject to this subsection and subsection (c), a
trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal is valid. The
trust terminates when no living animal is covered by the trust. A gov-
erning instrument must be liberally construed to bring the transfer
within this subsection, to presume against the merely precatory or
honorary nature of the disposition, and to carry out the general intent
of the transferor. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in determining the
transferor's intent.
(c) [Additional Provisions Applicable to Honorary Trusts and Trusts for
Pets.] In addition to the provisions of subsection (a) or (b), a trust cov-
ered by either of those subsections is subject to the following provisions:
(1) Except as expressly provided otherwise in the trust instrument,
no portion of the principal or income may be converted to the use of
the trustee or to any use other than for the trust's purposes or for
the benefit of a covered animal.
(2) Upon termination, the trustee shall transfer the unexpended
trust property in the following order:
(i) as directed in the trust instrument;
(ii) if the trust was created in a nonresiduary clause in the
transferor's will or in a codicil to the transferor's will, under
the residuary clause in the transferor's will; and
(iii) if no taker is produced by the application of subparagraph
(i) or (ii), to the transferor's heirs under Section 2-711.
(3) For the purposes of Section 2-707, the residuary clause is
treated as creating a future interest under the terms of a trust.
(4) The intended use of the principal or income can be enforced by
an individual designated for that purpose in the trust instrument
or, if none, by an individual appointed by a court upon application
to it by an individual.
(5) Except as ordered by the court or required by the trust instru-
ment, no filing, report, registration, periodic accounting, separate
maintenance of funds, appointment, or fee is required by reason of
the existence of the fiduciary relationship of the trustee.
(6) A court may reduce the amount of the property transferred, if it
determines that that amount substantially exceeds the amount re-
quired for the intended use. The amount of the reduction, if any,
passes as unexpended trust property under subsection (c)(2).
(7) If no trustee is designated or no designated trustee is willing or
able to serve, a court shall name a trustee. A court may order the
transfer of the property to another trustee, if required to assure
that the intended use is carried out and if no successor trustee is
designated in the trust instrument or if no designated successor
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either non-substantive or designed to provide greater guid-
ance to non-animal trusts for noncharitable purposes. How-
ever, two changes significantly affected animal trusts-one
increases the ability of a pet owner to carry out his or her in-
tent while the other curtails that intent.2 The first major
change removes the twenty-one year limitation on the dura-
tion of the trust.293 An owner of a long-lived animal may thus
use the Uniform provision to create a trust to provide care for
the animal's entire remaining life.
The second major change removes the pet owner's power
to care for the pet animal's offspring.94 Although this change
imposes a restriction on a pet owner's ability to carry out his
or her intent, the author believes, based on the provisions for
animals discussed in the reported cases, few pet owners at-
tempt to provide for unborn animals.29
c. Acceptance of Uniform Probate Code Approach
Over half of the states that have enacted the Uniform
Probate Code have declined the opportunity to adopt optional
section 2-907.9' The 1993 version of section 2-907 has been
substantially enacted by seven of the Uniform Probate Code
states: Alaska,297 Arizona,29 Colorado,299 Michigan, °° Mon-
tana,0 I New Mexico,0 2 and Utah.3  In addition, North Caro-
lina ° has adopted a free-standing statute heavily based on
trustee agrees to serve or is able to serve. A court may also make
such other orders and determinations as shall be advisable to carry
out the intent of the transferor and the purpose of this section.]
Id. § 2-907.
292. See generally Hirsch, supra note 270, at 941 n.27 (explaining the process
behind the 1993 changes to section 2-907 relevant to animal trusts).
293. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(b).
294. See id.
295. See supra Parts I.B & III.C.
296. Of the sixteen states that have enacted the Uniform Probate Code, the
following nine states did not adopt section 2-907: Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine,
Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Carolina, and South Dakota.
297. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.907 (Michie 1998).
298. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2907 (West 1995).
299. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-901 (West 1999).
300. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2722 (West Supp. 1999).
301. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-1017 (1999).
302. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-907 (Michie Supp. 1995).
303. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1001 (Supp. 1999).
304. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-147 (1995) (adopting Uniform Probate Code
section 2-907 although not enacting Uniform Probate Code generally). See gen-
erally Ronald C. Link & Kimberly A. Licata, Perpetuities Reform in North Caro-
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section 2-907. No state currently uses the 1990 version of
section 2-907.
Most of the enacting jurisdictions vary little, if at all,
from the text of the Uniform provision. Colorado is, however,
a notable exception."5 Colorado permits the pet owner to in-
clude an animal in gestation,"' requires the trust to be regis-
tered, 307 subjects the trust to all normal trust rules,38 and
does not authorize the court to reduce the amount of property
the pet owner transferred to the trust.0 9
d. Judicial Interpretation in Enacting States
Litigation under section 2-907 has been extremely lim-
ited. The 1998 case of In re Fouts3 ° appears to be the only re-
ported case directly citing section 2-907. A trust was estab-
lished for the care of five chimpanzees who are proficient with
American Sign Language.31" ' The validity of the trust was not
in issue."2 Instead, the trustee wanted to change the situs of
the trust from New York to Washington and asked the court
to appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the chimpanzees.313
The court avoided the issue of whether the chimpanzees were
"persons" entitled to a guardian ad litem because the statute
authorizes the court to appoint an enforcer to protect the in-
terests of the animal beneficiaries. " "The enforcer... per-
forms the same function as a guardian ad litem for an inca-
pacitated person."35 The court then appointed an enforcer to
receive service of process for the chimpanzees. 0
lina: The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, Nondonative Transfers,
and Honorary Trusts, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1783, 1805-07 (1996) (discussing North
Carolina's adoption of section 2-907).
305. See generally Bette Heller, Trusts for Pets, COLO. LAW., Mar. 1997, at 71
(discussing Colorado variations from Uniform text).
306. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-901(2) (West 1999) (determining
when an animal is in gestation based on the time the animal becomes a present
beneficiary of the trust).
307. See id. § 15-11-901(3)(e).
308. See id.
309. See id. § 15-11-901(3)(f) (reserving the subsection rather than enacting
the text of the uniform provision).
310. In re Fouts, 176 Misc. 2d 521, 522 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1998).
311. See id. at 522.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-6.1 (McKinney 1996).




2. Other State Legislation
a. Permissive, but not Enforceable
Some states have adopted an honorary-trust-type ap-
proach by authorizing the trustee to care for the designated
animal. These states, however, do not follow the lead of the
Uniform Probate Code by making the pet owner's desires en-
forceable. For example, California's statute provides:
A trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal
may be performed by the trustee for the life of the animal,
whether or not there is a beneficiary who can seek en-
forcement or termination of the trust and whether or not
the terms of the trust contemplate a longer duration. a+
This permissive statute limits the duration of the trust to the
life of the animal regardless of the terms of the trust and thus
a pet owner may not provide for descendants of animals born
after the owner's death.318 On the other hand, the owner may
provide for care that will last the entire lifetime of a long-
lived animal. 39 The statute protects the trust from attacks
based on duration and lack of a beneficiary who has standing
to enforce the trust. °
Missouri's enabling statute is similar to California's, but
does not require the pet animal to be specifically designated.
This opens the door for the owner to make arrangements for
the pet's descendants. 321  However, Missouri limits the dura-
tion of the trust to twenty-one years and thus the owner of a
long-lived animal may not rely on the statute to provide care
for the entire remaining life of the animal.322
Tennessee has a detailed statute governing honorary
trusts for animals.3" The statute begins by authorizing a gift




321. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.055 (West 1992). Missouri's statute provides:
A trust for care of pet animals or other lawful specific noncharitable
purpose, society or organization may be carried out by the intended
trustee or a successor trustee for twenty-one years or any shorter pe-
riod specified by the terms of the trust although it has no ascertainable
human beneficiary or might, by its terms, last longer than the period of
the rule against perpetuities.
Id.
322. See id.
323. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-50-118 (1996). This statute reads as follows:
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for the humane treatment and care of specific animals, even
though such a gift "creates a perpetuity in such animal or
animals, or creates a condition subsequent that must be ful-
filled before a person is entitled to the outright receipt of the
gift or devise."324 However, the trust lacks a beneficiary who
is capable of enforcing the trust, thus the trust is unenforce-
able and only "bind[s] the conscience of the trustee."3" The
pet owner should name a trustee, but if the owner fails to do
so, the individual to receive distributions on behalf of the
animal serves as the trustee and holds the property in trust
for the benefit of the animal.2 ' The statute also mandates
that the trust cannot last for more than twenty-one years af-
ter the pet owner's death.2
Wisconsin's statute does not speak directly to trusts for
animals, but instead refers generally to honorary trusts.3 28 It
(a) Any gift or devise under a will or trust having as its object the hu-
mane treatment and care of a specific animal or animals designated by
the donor and testator shall be valid, even though it creates a perpetu-
ity in such animal or animals, or creates a condition subsequent that
must be fulfilled before a person is entitled to the outright receipt of the
gift or devise. Such gift or devise shall be considered an honorary
trust, that is, one binding the conscience of the trustee, since there is
no beneficiary capable of enforcing such a trust.
(b) Such gift or devise shall provide for the appointment of a trustee to
carry out the provisions of the trust, but in the event that no trustee or
successor trustee is named, the person designated as donee or devisee
of such gift or devise, or in the case such person is a minor, then the
minor's court-appointed representative, shall serve as trustee and hold
such property in trust for the benefit of such animal or animals.
(c) Any such trust shall terminate and any conditions shall be extin-
guished on the death of such animal or animals or as provided for by
will or trust, but in all events, any such trust shall terminate twenty-
one (21) years after the death of the donor or testator.
Id.
324. Id. § 35-50-118(a).
325. Id.
326. See id. § 35-50-118(b).
327. See id. § 35-50-118(c).
328. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701.11(1) (West Supp. 1999). This statute reads
as follows:
[Wlhere the owner of property makes a testamentary transfer in trust
for a specific noncharitable purpose, and there is no definite or defi-
nitely ascertainable human beneficiary designated, no enforceable trust
is created; but the transferee has power to apply the property to the
designated purpose, unless the purpose is capricious. If the transferee
refuses or neglects to apply the property to the designated purpose
within a reasonable time and the transferor has not manifested an in-
tention to make a beneficial gift to the transferee, a resulting trust
arises in favor of the transferor's estate and the court is authorized to
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provides that the owner of property may make a transfer in
trust for a specific noncharitable purpose, but that no en-
forceable trust is created."9 "[T]he transferee has power to
apply the property to the designated purpose, unless the pur-
pose is capricious."330 Wisconsin courts are then placed in the
position of determining whether caring for a pet animal is ca-
pricious. Based on the number of cases and statutes in other
jurisdictions upholding the use of an owner's property to care
for animals, it is unlikely that a court would find a reasonable
gift for the animal capricious. If the transferee fails to use
the property for the stated purpose within a reasonable time,
the property returns to the owner's estate, unless the owner
indicates in the will that the transferee is to retain the prop-
erty.331
b. Enforceable
In 1996, New York enacted a statute directly authorizing
enforceable trusts for the care of pets.332 This statute borrows





332. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-6.1 (McKinney Supp. 1999).
This statute reads as follows:
(a) A trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet animal is valid.
The intended use of the principal or income may be enforced by an in-
dividual designated for that purpose in the trust instrument or, if none,
by an individual appointed by a court upon application to it by an indi-
vidual, or by a trustee. Such trust shall terminate when no living ani-
mal is covered by the trust, or at the end of twenty-one years, which-
ever occurs earlier.
(b) Except as expressly provided otherwise in the trust instrument, no
portion of the principal or income may be converted to the use of the
trustee or to any use other than for the benefit of a covered animal.
(c) Upon termination, the trustee shall transfer the unexpended trust
property as directed in the trust instrument or, if there are no such di-
rections in the trust instrument, the property shall pass to the estate of
the grantor.
(d) A court may reduce the amount of the property transferred if it de-
termines that amount substantially exceeds the amount required for
the intended use. The amount of the reduction, if any, passes as unex-
pended trust property pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section.
(e) If no trustee is designated or no designated trustee is willing or able
to serve, a court shall appoint a trustee and may make such other or-
ders and determinations as are advisable to carry out the intent of the
transferor and the purpose of this section.
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heavily from the Uniform provisions and contains the follow-
ing key features.333 The trust may be enforced by an enforcer
appointed by the pet owner or by the court. 34 The duration of
the trust is limited to the shorter of twenty-one years or the
life of the pet and thus the owner of a long-lived animal is not
able to provide the animal with lifetime support. 5 The trust
income and corpus must be used only for the covered animals;
the trustee may not use the property personally or apply it to
any other purpose.336 The court may remove property from
the trust if it determines that the corpus substantially ex-
ceeds the amount needed to care for the animal.337 This prop-
erty then passes as if the trust ended, either to the designated
remainder beneficiaries or, if none, back to the pet owner's es-
tate.338 As with non-animal trusts, the court will appoint a
trustee if the pet owner failed to designate a trustee or the
named trustee is unwilling or unable to serve. 9 The court
also has the authority to make any order or determination
that is advisable to carry out the pet owner's intent.4
c. Other Relevant Statutes
Some states have specific statutory provisions dealing
with the treatment of animals after the owner's death. For
example, Oregon law provides that "[a]ny family member of
the [owner], friend of the [owner] or animal shelter may take
custody of the animal immediately upon the death of the
[owner].""1 The caretaker is then entitled to reimbursement
from the owner's estate for the cost of caring for the animal.
342
Upon request of the owner's personal representative, or the
new owner of the animal under the owner's will or via intes-
tacy, the caretaker must deliver the animal to the appropriate
333. For a review of the New York statute, see Frances Carlisle & Paul
Franken, Drafting Trusts for Animals, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 13, 1997, at 1; Joshua S.
Rubenstein, 1996 New York State Legislative Changes Affecting Estate Planning
and Administration, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 11 (1997); Taylor, supra note 68, at
427-29.
334. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-6.1(a).
335. See id.
336. See id. § 7-6.1(b).
337. See id. § 7-6.1(d).
338. See id. § 7-6.1(c).
339. See id. § 7-6.1(e).
340. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-6.1(e).





3. Repeal of Rule Against Perpetuities
A rapidly growing number of states are repealing the rule
against perpetuities.3 " This action removes a major road-
block from a court's ability to approve trusts for specific ani-
mals, although it is unlikely that the legislatures repealed
the rule with animal gifts in mind.345
E. Destruction of Pet
Some pet owners believe that their pets will be dis-
traught after their death and thus request their pets be
killed.346 Courts are extremely reluctant to enforce animal
euthanasia provisions.347 The case of Capers Estate 8 provides
a good example of this situation and the tremendous public
outcry that follows when the contents of a pet euthanasia will
become public.349 The owner's will directed the executors to
arrange for Brickland and Sunny Birch, his two Irish setters,
343. See id.
344. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050(a)(3) (Michie 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
25, § 503(a) (Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1994); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.
305/2-6 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-102(e)
(Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 43-5-8 (Michie 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 700.16 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998).
345. See Angela M. Vallario, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Rule Against
Perpetuities, 25 J. LEGIS. 141, 141 (1999) (concluding that the motivating factors
behind the repeal of the rule are to (1) provide "wealthy settlors with transfer
tax advantages," and (2) allow 'jurisdictions to remain competitive in the trust
capital business").
346. See Frances Carlisle, Destruction of Pets by Will Provision, 16 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 894 (1981); Phillip Jamieson, The Family Pet: A Limita-
tion on the Freedom of Testamentary Disposition?, 9 U. TASMANIA L. REV. 51
(1987); Schwartz, supra note 20, at 379.
347. See Vicki Quade, Animal Rights Law: Barking Up a New Tree, 68 AB.AK
J. 663 (1982) (citing Smith v. Avanzino, No. 225698 (Sup. Ct. San Francisco
June 17, 1980) (invalidating a euthanasia provision "saying the owner would
have wanted her pet to live if a good home could be found")). See generally Pub-
lications Committee of the State Bar of Nevada, supra note 12 (advising that
providing for pet euthanasia upon the owner's death "is almost never a good
idea and may not even be considered humane"); cf City of Austin v. Austin Natl
Bank of Austin, 503 S.W.2d 759, 760 (Tex. 1973) (failing to address validity of
provision in the pet owner's holographic will that her dog be "put to sleep by Dr.
Linam At home and and buried in my yard").
348. In re Capers Estate, 15 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. 150 (Orphans' Ct. 1964).
349. See id. at 156, 159 (mentioning the letters regarding the case that the
court received and that were published by the news media).
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to "be destroyed in a humane manner."35 The executors filed
for a declaratory judgment, realizing that if they followed the
pet owner's wishes but the will provision was later found in-
valid, there would be no way of remedying the situation be-
cause the dogs would already be dead."5' The public outrage
was so strong that the Governor of Pennsylvania ordered the
state attorney general to intervene to prohibit the executors
from carrying out the pet owner's wishes.'52
The court realized that the pet owner "feared that either
[Brickland and Sunny Birch] would grieve for her or that no
one would afford them the same affection and kindness that
they received during her life."'5' The court examined extrinsic
evidence, such as the testimony of the veterinarian, and con-
cluded that the pet owner's fears were unfounded.' The
court concluded that her intent would be better served by
placing the dogs in a good home where they would be "doubt-
lessly as happy and contented as they were during the life of
their owner."'55
The court then analyzed the validity of the pet destruc-
tion provision, determining that enforcement would be un-
ethical. 6' The court emphasized that euthanizing Brickland
and Sunny Birch would serve no purpose and would consti-
tute an act of "cruelty" and "gross inhumanity" which the
court could not sanction.5 7 In addition, the court concluded
that although a property owner may "dispose" of property in a
350. Id. at 150 (granting the executors "full and complete power and discre-
tion" to carry out the destruction).
351. See id. at 153.
352. See id. at 152.
353. Id. at 155.
354. See Capers Estate, 15 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. at 155.
355. Id. The court did not explain how it concluded that the dogs were just
as happy as while their master was alive. See id.
356. See id. at 156. Earlier in its opinion, the court quoted a lengthy passage
from Missouri Senator George G. Vest's jury address in which he stated:
The one absolutely unselfish friend that a man can have in this selfish
world, the one that never deserts him, the one that never proves un-
grateful or treacherous, is his dog.... [A] man's dog stands by him, in
prosperity and poverty, in health and sickness. He will sleep on the
cold ground, where the wintry wind blows and the snow drives fiercely
if only he may be near his master's side. He will kiss the hand that has
no food to offer .... When all other friends desert, he remains. When
riches take wing and reputation falls to pieces, he is as constant in his
love as the sun in its journey through the heavens.
Id. at 152.
357. See id. at 156-58.
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will, the owner has no power to order the destruction of prop-
erty, be it a pet animal or any other type of property.358 The
dogs then passed via the residuary clause of the owner's will
to the Western Pennsylvania Humane Society, which was
urged to permit the person who had been caring for the ani-
mals for almost two years to retain the dogs."9
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The primary goal of the pet owner's attorney is to carry
out the pet owner's intent to the fullest extent allowed under
applicable law."' Accordingly, the attorney should select a
method with the highest likelihood of working successfully to
provide for the pet after its owner's death.3 1 This section dis-
cusses the variety of techniques currently available and
comments on the advisability of each.
A. Prepare an "Animal Card" and an 'Animal Document"
The owner should take two important steps to assure
that the animal receives proper care immediately upon the
owner being unable to look after the animal. The owner
should carry an "animal card" in the owner's wallet or
purse. ' This card should contain information about the pet,
such as the name, type of animal, location where housed, and
358. See id. at 162 (quoting the brief submitted by the attorney general's of-
fice as stating that "[there is no definition or any interpretation to be found in
any cases which enlarges the meaning of the word 'dispose' to include destroy")
(emphasis omitted).
359. See id. at 164-66. The caretaker was willing to waive any claim for the
upkeep of dogs accruing since the owner's death in exchange for the "privilege"
of becoming their new owner. See id. at 162.
360. See generally JOHN J. GARGAN, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO ESTATE
PLANNING 1 (1978) (defining estate planning as "the accumulation, conserva-
tion, and eventual distribution of property according to personal objectives");
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 549 (6th ed. 1990) (defining estate planning as "[tihat
branch of the law which, in arranging a person's property and estate, takes into
account the laws of wills, taxes, insurance, property, and trusts so as to gain
maximum benefit of all laws while carrying out the person's own wishes for the
disposition of... property upon... death"); John K O'Meara, Estate Planning
Concerns for the Professional Athlete, 3 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 85, 85 (1992) (ex-
plaining that estate planning includes "the orderly and economical creation of
property for the ultimate enjoyment of the estate creator, his or her family and
any others he or she may want to benefit").
361. The pet owner should also determine if any special arrangements need
to be made to care for the pet if the owner becomes disabled. These instructions
may be included in a durable power of attorney.
362. See Publications Committee of the State Bar of Nevada, supra note 12.
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special care instructions, along with the information neces-
sary to contact someone who can obtain access to the pet. 3 If
the owner is injured or killed, emergency personnel will rec-
ognize that an animal is relying on the owner's return for care
and may notify the named person, or take other steps to lo-
cate and provide for the animal.364 The animal card helps as-
sure that the animal survives to the time when the owner's
plans for the pet's long-term care take effect.
In addition, the owner should prepare an "animal docu-
ment." The document should contain the same information
as on the animal card and perhaps additional details as well.
The owner should keep the animal document in the same lo-
cation where the pet owner keeps his or her estate planning
documents. 65 The benefit of this technique is basically the
same as for carrying the animal card: an enhanced likelihood
that the owner's desires regarding the pet will be made
known to the appropriate person in a timely manner.
B. Make a Conditional Gift to the Pet's Caretaker, in Trust
The most predictable and reliable method to provide for a
pet animal is for the owner to create an enforceable inter vi-
vos or testamentary trust in favor of a human beneficiary,
then require the trustee to make distributions to the benefici-
ary to cover the pet's expenses, provided of course the benefi-
ciary is taking proper care of the pet. 6 This technique avoids
the two traditional problems with gifts to benefit pet animals.
First, the actual beneficiary is a human, thus there is a bene-
ficiary with standing to enforce the trust. Second, there is a
human measuring life for rule against perpetuities purposes.
363. See id.
364. See id.
365. See Jerry Langdon, Estate Planning-Preparation of Vital Information
Will Make Life Easier for Heirs, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 14, 1998, at
1B (reporting that survivors need to know the pet owner's desires regarding
care of orphaned pets).
366. See generally Shearer, supra note 189, at 104 ("[Tlhe intent of such a
testator to provide for his pets after his death might better be carried out by
means of a conditional gift."); Validity of a Testamentary Trust For Benefit of
Specific Animals, supra note 103, at 564 (recommending "an annuity to the cus-
todian for his life determinable upon the death of the animals"); Wills-Provid-
ing for Care of Specific Animals, supra note 89, at 678 n.3 (indicating that best
technique is "to give both the legal and equitable title to a legatee, making the
gift conditional upon his taking care of the animals"). The conditional gift in
trust is actually better because of enhanced enforceability.
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Even if the owner lives in a state that enforces animal trusts,
the conditional gift in trust may provide for more flexibility
and a greater likelihood of the owner's intent being carried
out. For example, some states limit the duration of an animal
trust to twenty-one years. If a long-lived animal is involved,
the trust may end before the animal dies." '
A wide variety of factors and considerations come into
play when drafting a trust to carry out the pet owner's de-
sires. This section discusses the issues that the pet owner
should address.
1. Determine Whether to Create an Inter Vivos or a
Testamentary Trust
The pet owner must initially determine whether to create
an inter vivos trust or a testamentary trust.3 s An inter vivos
trust takes effect immediately and will be in operation when
the owner dies. This type of trust avoids the delay between
the owner's death, the probating of the will, and the subse-
quent functioning of the trust.3 9 Funds may not be available
to provide the pet with proper care during this delay period.
The pet owner may also make changes to the inter vivos trust
more easily than to a testamentary trust, which requires the
execution of a new will or codicil.37°
On the other hand, the inter vivos trust may have addi-
tional start-up costs and administration expenses. A separate
trust document would be needed and the owner must part
with property to fund the trust. However, the inter vivos
trust could be nominally funded and revocable. Additional
funding could be tied to a nonprobate asset, such as a bank
account naming the trustee (in trust) as the pay-on-death
payee or a life insurance policy naming the trustee (in trust)
as the beneficiary, to provide the trust with immediate funds
after the owner's death. 1 If appropriate, the pet owner could
provide additional property by using a pour-over provision in
367. See Carlisle & Franken, supra note 333, at 1.
368. See id. (discussing factors in determining whether pet owner should cre-
ate inter vivos or testamentary trust).
369. See generally GERRY W. BEYER, WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES-EXAMPLES
& EXPLANATIONS § 13.2 (1999) (explaining the problems caused by the gap be-
tween the time of a testator's death and the distribution of the testator's estate).
370. See id. § 13.7 (describing how trusts and other nonprobate techniques
are easier to update than wills).
371. See Carlisle & Franken, supra note 333, at 1.
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the owner's will. 2
2. Designate a Trust Beneficiary/Animal Caretaker
The pet owner must thoughtfully select a caretaker for
the animal. This person becomes the actual beneficiary of the
trust and has standing to enforce the trust if the trustee fails
to carry out its terms. Thus, the caretaker should be suffi-
ciently savvy to understand the basic functioning of a trust
and his or her enforcement rights.
It is of the utmost importance for the pet owner to locate
a beneficiary/caretaker who is willing and able to care for the
animal in a manner that the owner would find acceptable.
The prospective caretaker should be questioned before being
named, in order to ensure the caretaker will assume the po-
tentially burdensome obligation of caring for the pet, espe-
cially when the pet is in need of medical care or requires spe-
cial attention as it ages. 3 The pet and the prospective
caretaker should meet and spend quality time together to
make sure they, and the caretaker's family, get along harmo-
niously with each other.
The pet owner should name several alternate caretakers
should the owner's first choice be unable to serve for the du-
ration of the pet's life. To prevent the pet from ending up
homeless, the owner may authorize the trustee to select a
good home for the pet should none of the named individuals
be willing or able to accept the animal. The trustee should
not, however, have the authority to appoint himself or herself
as the caretaker, as such an appointment would eliminate the
checks and balances aspect of separating the caregiver from
the money provider. 74
3. Nominate a Trustee
As with the designation of the caretaker, the pet owner
needs to select the trustee with care and check with the trus-
372. See id.
373. See Taylor, supra note 68, at 422-23 (discussing problem if caretaker
refuses the gift); Publications Committee of the State Bar of Nevada, supra note
12.
374. But see Carlisle & Franken, supra note 333, at 1 (asserting that it is
"more convenient and less expensive" to have the same person serve as the trus-
tee and the caretaker).
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tee before making a nomination.375 The trustee, whether indi-
vidual or corporate, must be willing to administer the prop-
erty for the benefit of the animal, and to expend the time and
effort necessary to deal with trust administration matters. If
the pet owner has sufficient funds, a stipend for the trustee
may be appropriate. The pet owner should name alternate
trustees should the named trustee be unable to serve until
the trust terminates. In addition, an alternate trustee may
have standing to remove the original trustee from office
should the original trustee cease to administer the trust for
the benefit of the pet.376
4. Bequeath the Animal to the Trustee, in Trust
The pet owner should bequeath the animal to the trustee,
in trust, with directions to deliver custody of the pet to the
beneficiary/caretaker. If the owner has left instructions in an
animal card or document, 7 the animal may actually already
be in the possession of the caretaker.
5. Determine the Amount of Other Property to Transfer
to the Trust
The pet owner should carefully compute the amount of
property necessary to care for the animal and provide addi-
tional payments, if any, for the caretaker and the trustee.378
The factors to consider when making this decision are the
type of animal, the animal's life expectancy, the standard of
living the owner wishes to provide for the animal, and the
need for potentially expensive medical treatment. Adequate
funds should also be included to provide the animal with
proper care, be it an animal-sitter or a professional boarding
business, when the caretaker is on vacation, out of town on
375. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 376 (recommending that the owner ob-
tain prior approval from prospective trustee); cf In re Howells' Estate, 260
N.Y.S. 598 (Sur. Ct. 1932), modified, 261 N.Y.S. 859 (1933) (quoting pet owner's
will which provided that the named individuals had personally assured the
owner that they would assume the responsibility of directing the trustee re-
garding distributions for the care, comfort, and maintenance of the pet ani-
mals).
376. See Wills-Providing for Care of Specific Animals, supra note 89, at 680.
377. See supra Part IV.A.
378. See Torri Still, This Attorney is for the Birds, RECORDER (San Fran-
cisco), Mar. 22, 1999, at 4 (reporting that one attorney typically recommends
$10,000 per pet).
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business, receiving care in a hospital, or otherwise temporar-
ily unable to personally provide for the animal.
The size of the owner's estate must also be considered. If
the owner's estate is relatively large, the owner could transfer
sufficient property so the trustee could make payments pri-
marily from the income and use the principal only for emer-
gencies."9 On the other hand, if the owner's estate is small,
the owner may wish to transfer a lesser amount and antici-
pate that the trustee will supplement income with principal
invasions as necessary.380
The pet owner must avoid transferring an unreasonably
large amount of money or other property to the trust because
such a gift is likely to encourage heirs and remainder benefi-
ciaries of the owner's will to contest the arrangement. 81 The
pet owner should determine a reasonable amount for the care
of the animals and fund the trust accordingly. Even if the
owner has no desire to benefit family members, friends, or
charities until the demise of the animal, the owner should not
leave his or her entire estate for the animal's benefit. If the
amount of property left to the trust is unreasonably large, the
court may reduce the amount to what it considers reason-
able.38 2
6. Describe the Desired Standard of Living for the Pet
The owner should specify the type of care the beneficiary
is to give the animal and the expenses for which the caretaker
can expect reimbursement from the trust. Typical expenses
include food, housing, grooming, medical care, and burial or
cremation fees.3 The pet owner may also want to include
379. See Carlisle & Franken, supra note 333, at 1.
380. See id.
38L See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 378 (explaining dangers of overfunding).
See generally WINOKUR, supra note 12, at 40 (reporting that Wayne KiMrn's 1990
365 Dogs Calendar discussed a gift of $30 million to Toby, a poodle, which
caused bickering to such an extent that the executors euthanized the dog).
382. See, e.g., In re Templeton Estate, 4 Pa. Fiduc. Rep. 2d 172, 175 (Or-
phans' Ct. 1984) (applying "inherent power to reduce the amount involved.., to
an amount which is sufficient to accomplish [the owner's] purpose"); In re Lyon's
Estate, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 474, 482-83 (C.P. Orphans' Ct. 1974) (reducing the
amount left for the animal's care based on the supposition that the owner mis-
took how much money would be needed to care for the animals); cf UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c)(6) (amended 1993) (authorizing the court to reduce
amount if it "substantially exceeds the amount required" to care for the animal).
383. See Carlisle & Franken, supra note 333, at 1.
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more detailed instructions. Alternatively, the owner may
leave the specifics of the type of care to the discretion of the
trustee. If the pet owner elects to do so, the pet owner should
seriously consider providing the caretaker with general
guidelines both to avoid claims that the caretaker is expend-
ing an unreasonable amount on the animal and to prevent the
caretaker from expending excessive funds. For example, in
the In re Rogers3" case, the court determined that the care-
taker acted unreasonably when he purchased an automobile
to transport the dog, while stating that it was a matter of
opinion whether the purchase of a washing machine to laun-
der the dog's bed clothing was reasonable."5
7. Specify the Distribution Method
The owner should specify how the trustee is to make dis-
bursements from the trust. The simplest method is for the
owner to direct the trustee to pay the caretaker a fixed sum
each month regardless of the actual care expenses. If the care
expenses are less than the distribution, the caretaker enjoys a
windfall for his or her efforts. If the care expenses are
greater than the distribution, the caretaker absorbs the cost.
The caretaker may, however, be unable or unwilling to make
expenditures in excess of the fixed distribution that are nec-
essary for the animal. Thus, the owner should permit the
trustee to reimburse the caretaker for out-of-pocket expenses
exceeding the normal distribution.
Alternatively, the owner could provide only for reim-
bursement of expenses. The caretaker would submit receipts
for expenses associated with the animal on a periodic basis.
The trustee would review the expenses in light of the level of
care the pet owner specified and reimburse the caretaker if
the expenses are appropriate. Although this method may be
in line with the owner's intent, the pet owner must realize
that there will be additional administrative costs and an in-
creased burden on the caretaker to retain and submit re-
ceipts.
384. In re Rogers, 412 P.2d 710, 710-11 (Ariz. 1966) (suspending the care-
taker-attorney from the practice of law for 60 days).
385. See id. at 713.
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8. Establish Additional Distributions for the Caretaker
The owner should determine whether the trustee should
make distributions to the caretaker above and beyond the
amount established for the animal's care. An owner may be-
lieve that the addition of the animal to the caretaker's family
is sufficient, especially if the trustee reimburses the caretaker
for all reasonable expenses. On the other hand, the animal
may impose a burden on the caretaker, thus additional distri-
butions may be appropriate to encourage the caretaker to
continue as the trust's beneficiary. In addition, the caretaker
may feel more duty bound to provide good care if the care-
taker is receiving additional distributions contingent on pro-
viding the animal with appropriate care.
9. Limit the Duration of the Trust
The duration of the trust should not be linked to the life
of the pet.38 The measuring life of a trust must be a human
being,8 7 unless the state law has enacted specific statutes for
animal trusts, or has modified or abolished the rule against
perpetuities. For example, the pet owner could establish the
trust's duration as twenty-one years beyond the life of the
named caretakers and trustees, with the possibility of the
trust ending sooner if the pet dies within the twenty-one year
period. 8
10. Designate a Remainder Beneficiary
The pet owner should clearly designate a remainder
beneficiary to take any remaining trust property upon the
death of the pet. Otherwise, court involvement will be neces-
sary, with the most likely result being a resulting trust for
the benefit of the owner's successors in interest.38 9 The pet
386. See Wills-Providing for Care of Specific Animals, supra note 89, at 679
(stating that "to base the duration of the trust upon the life of the animals
which are beneficiaries is a hazardous move").
387. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.3 cmt. i (1977) (stating
that "animals cannot be used as measuring lives").
388. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 377 (deeming this approach to be "a
highly technical approach to foil an equally technical requirement"); Wills-
Providing for Care of Specific Animals, supra note 89, at 679.
389. See Willett v. Willett, 247 S.W. 739, 741 (Ky. 1923) (noticing that the pet
owner neglected to provide for the distribution of the remaining trust property




owner must be cautioned not to leave the remaining trust
property to the caretaker, because the caretaker would then
lack a financial motive to care for the animal and thus might
accelerate its death to gain immediate access to the trust cor-
pus."' The pet owner may also want to authorize the trustee
to terminate the trust before the pet's death, "if the remain-
ing principal is small and suitable arrangements have been
made for the care of the animals."
391
The pet owner may wish to consider naming a charity
which benefits animals as the remainder beneficiary, such as
a local chapter of the American Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals.39 "Hopefully the charity would want to
assure the well-being of the animals and an added advantage
is that the Attorney General would be involved to investigate
if any misappropriation of funds by the trustee occurred."393
11. Identify the Animal to Prevent Fraud
The pet owner should clearly identify the animal that is
to receive care under the trust. If this step is not taken, an
unscrupulous caretaker could replace a deceased, lost, or sto-
len animal with a replacement so that the caretaker may con-
tinue to receive benefits. For example, there is a report that
"[a] trust was established for a black cat to be cared for by its
deceased owner's maid. Inconsistencies in the reported age of
the pet tipped off authorities to the fact that the maid was on
her third black cat, the original long since having died."394
The pet owner may use a variety of methods to identify
the animal. A relatively simple and inexpensive method is for
the trust to contain a detailed description of the animal, in-
cluding any unique characteristics such as blotches of colored
fur and scars. Veterinarian records and pictures of the ani-
mal are also helpful. A more sophisticated procedure is for
the pet owner to have a microchip implanted in the animal.99
390. See Quade, supra note 347, at 663.
391. Carlisle & Franken, supra note 333, at 1.
392. See id.
393. Id. Charitable trusts, such as those giving property to the organizations
in the text, are enforceable by the attorney general of the state. See id.
394. Still, supra note 378, at 4 (relating a conversation between attorney
Elizabeth Anne Bird and the former president of the San Francisco Society for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Richard Avanzino).
395. The microchip is implanted by injection and the discomfort to the ani-
mal is minimal. See Charlene Hager-Van Dyke, High-Tech House Pets-Volusia
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The trustee can then have the animal scanned to verify that
the animal the caretaker is minding is the same animal. Of
course, an enterprising caretaker could surgically remove the
microchip and have it implanted in another physically similar
animal. The best, albeit expensive, method to assure identifi-
cation is for the trustee to retain a sample of the animal's
DNA before turning the animal over to the caretaker. The
trustee could then run periodic comparisons between the re-
tained sample and new samples from the animal.
A pet owner, however, may be less concerned with pro-
viding for the animals owned at the time of will execution,
and more concerned with the care of the animals actually
owned at time of death. "It would be onerous for [the owner]
to execute a new trust instrument or will whenever a new
animal joins the family."396 In this situation, the owner may
wish to describe the animals as a class instead of by individ-
ual name or specific description.397
12. Require the Trustee to Inspect the Animal on a
Regular Basis
The owner should require the trustee to make regular in-
spections of the animal to determine its physical and psycho-
logical condition. The inspections should be at random times
so the caretaker does not provide the animal with extra food,
medical care, or attention merely because the caretaker
knows the trustee is coming. The inspections should take
place in the caretaker's home so the trustee may observe first-
hand the environment in which the animal is being kept.
Veterinarians Want Animal Owners to Cash in on Chips That Track Lost Loved
Ones, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 23, 2000, at K1 (stating that the cost of the chip
and implantation is approximately $40 per animal but was reduced to $10 for a
special clinic and indicating that the lifespan of an implanted chip is about 25
years); Toni Heinzl, Adopted Pets to Carry Computerized IDs; Implanting Mi-
crochips, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, July 9, 1999, at 1 (explaining that the chip is
about the size of a grain of rice and is implanted with a sterile needle between
the pet's shoulder blades and indicating that there are no health risks). Suppli-
ers of animal tracking microchips include Avid Canada (www.avidcanada.com)
and Trovan Electronic Identification Systems (www.trovan.com).
396. Carlisle & Franken, supra note 333, at 1.
397. See id. (suggesting that the instrument cover all animals that the owner
"may own or be caring for at the time of the [owner's] death").
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13. Provide Instructions for the Final Disposition of the
Animal
The pet owner should include instructions for the final
disposition of the animal when the animal dies."' For exam-
ple, the owner may want the animal to be buried in a pet
cemetery399 or cremated with the ashes either distributed or
placed in an urn."' A memorial for the pet may also be cre-
ated for viewing on a variety of Internet sites."1
C. Consider an Outright Conditional Gift
An outright gift of the animal, coupled with a reasonable
sum to care for the animal that is conditioned on the benefici-
ary taking proper care of the animal, is a simpler but less
predictable method of providing for a pet after its owner's
death. Both drafting and administrative costs are reduced if
the owner does not create a trust. However, this technique
should only be considered if the pet owner's estate is rela-
tively modest because there is a reduced likelihood of the
owner's intent being fulfilled since no person is directly
charged with ascertaining that the animal is receiving proper
care. Although the owner may designate a person to receive
the property if the pet is not receiving proper care, such per-
son might not police the caretaker sufficiently, especially if
the potential gift-over amount is small or the alternate taker
does not live close enough to the caretaker to make firsthand
398. The will of one pet owner is reported as containing the following provi-
sion: I[Upon the death of my pets they are to be embalmed and their caskets to
be placed in a Wilbert Vault at Pine Ridge Cemetery." The Last Laugh-Wills
With a Sense of Humor, FAM. ADVOC., Summer 1981, at 60, 62.
399. The cost for a pet burial ranges from $250 to $1,000. See Pet Cemeteries
Offer Owners Help When Dealing With Death, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Oct. 15, 1989, at 5A (explaining that cost depends on the size of the animal, the
composition of the casket, and the type of ceremony); see also ADAMEC, supra
note 1, at 91-95 (describing pros and cons of pet cemeteries and how to select
one); SIFE, supra note 1, at 119-24 (explaining options for the final disposition
of a pet).
400. Pet cremations are significantly less expensive than pet burials. See
ADAMEC, supra note 1, at 91-95 (reporting that the cost of a pet cremation is
$40 plus the cost of an urn as well as any burial plot or chapel service); see also
id. at 89-91 (describing benefits of pet cremation).
401. See, e.g., PLAN4ever, LLC, Planning for Life and Beyond-For Pets
(visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http'//www.plan4ever.com/pet/>; John E. Mingo, Sr., In
Memory of Pets (visited Feb. 11, 2000) <http'//www.in-memory-of-pets.com>;
LavaMind, Virtual Pet Cemetery (visited Feb. 11, 2000)
<http'//mycemetery.com/my/petmenu.html>.
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observations of the animal.
If the owner elects this method, the owner needs to de-
cide if the condition of taking care of the pet is a condition
precedent or a condition subsequent. If the owner elects a
condition precedent, the caretaker receives the property only
if the caretaker actually cares for the animal. Thus, if the
animal predeceases the owner, the caretaker would not bene-
fit from the gift. On the other hand, the owner could create a
condition subsequent so that the gift vests in the caretaker
and is only divested if the caretaker fails to provide proper
care.4" The owner should expressly state what happens to
the gift if the pet predeceases its owner. In the absence of ex-
press language, the caretaker would still receive a condition
subsequent gift, but not one based on a condition precedent."3
D. Follow the Applicable Statute, if Any
If the pet owner is domiciled in a state with a statute
authorizing the creation of enforceable trusts for animals, as
compared to states whose statutes merely authorize such ar-
rangements,4 4 the owner may desire to create an enforceable
trust under the statute rather than using the conditional gift
technique. Although the exact concerns depend on the par-
ticular statute involved, many considerations will be the same
as those for the conditional gift method."5 The effectiveness
of this technique may be compromised if, after executing the
will, the pet owner moves and then dies domiciled in a state
that does not have a similar statute.4 6
402. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 99, § 165, at 161 (indicating that the
animal's care "can be assured with reasonable certainty" by using this tech-
nique).
403. See In re Andrews' Will, 228 N.Y.S.2d 591, 594 (Sur. Ct. 1962) (holding
that the beneficiary received the legacy even though the pet died before the tes-
tator because the condition was subsequent). -
404. Compare supra Part III.D.2.a, with supra Part III.D.2.b.
405. Under Uniform Probate Code section 2-907, the owner should appoint
an enforcer, along with alternates, to keep a watchful eye on the trustee and the
animal.
406. See Taylor, supra note 68, at 438-39 (recommending inclusion of a sav-




E. Consider an Outright Gift to a Veterinarian or Animal
Shelter
A simple option available to the pet owner is to leave the
pet, and sufficient property for its care, to a veterinarian or
animal shelter."7 This alternative will not, however, appeal
to most pet owners who do not like the idea of the pet living
out its life in a clinic or shelter setting. The animal would no
longer be part of a family and not likely to receive the amount
and quality of special attention that the pet would receive in
a traditional home."' Nonetheless, this option may be desir-
able if the owner is unable to locate an appropriate caretaker
for the animal.
F. Avoid Honorary Trusts
Pet owners should avoid honorary trusts and related
techniques, be they judicially or statutorily authorized. If
state law validates trusts for specific animals by using the
honorary trust doctrine, the trustee will be permitted to carry
out the owner's intent and provide care for the pet.4"9 The
owner's heirs and beneficiaries would probably be unable to
successfully contest the trustee's use of the property for the
pet.410 However, the trustee cannot be forced to use the prop-
erty for the pet because honorary trusts are unenforceable.41'
If the trustee refuses to carry out the pet owner's intent, the
trust property simply passes to the remainder beneficiaries or
the owner's successors in interest.412 The owner's desire to
care for the animal may go unsatisfied. In addition, the in-
come tax ramifications of honorary trusts may not be as fa-
vorable as other arrangements.413
407. See Advertisement, TR. & EST., May 1987, at 44 (advertising North
Shore Animal League as proving lifetime home care for pets").
408. See Taylor, supra note 68, at 423 (indicating that "animal's quality of
life might not meet the expectations of the testator").
409. See generally supra Part III.A & C.1.
410. See generally supra Part III.A & C.1.
411. See generally supra Part I.A & C.1.
412. See generally supra Part LI.A & C.1.
413. See Rev. Rul. 76-486, 1976-2 C.B. 192 (explaining income tax treatment
of income earned by trusts for pet animals); Taylor, supra note 68, at 438 (con-
cluding that the tax implications are "harsh").
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V. CONCLUSION
Estate planning provides a method to care for those
whom we want to comfort after we die and to those who have
comforted us. Family members and friends can be a source of
tremendous support, but they may also let you down in a va-
riety of ways ranging from minor betrayals to actually orches-
trating your death.4"4 Pet animals, however, have a much bet-
ter track record in providing unconditional love and steadfast
loyalty.4"5 It is not surprising that a pet owner often wants to
assure that his or her trusted companion is well-cared for af-
ter the owner's death.
The American legal system, which should respect a per-
son's desires and accommodate them as long as they are not
harmful to others or against public policy, has a mediocre rec-
ord when it comes to permitting pet owners to arrange for af-
ter-death care of their pets. Over the past decade, the law
has made admirable steps forward. State legislatures are in-
creasingly enacting section 2-907 of the Uniform Probate
Code or a functional equivalent thereof. However, this trend
needs to continue so that every state has legislation author-
izing pet owners to create enforceable long-term care trusts
for their pets. Regardless of the existence of enabling legisla-
tion, pet owners may carefully prepare enforceable trusts un-
der traditional trust law that assure proper care for their
animals. Attorneys who prepare wills and other estate plan-
ning documents must be alert to the important role pets fre-
quently play in their clients' lives, and take the appropriate
steps to help clients provide short- and long-term quality care
for their "other" loved ones.
414. See Gutierrez Kruger, Homicides Know No Boundaries, ALBUQUERQUE
TRIB., Jan. 11, 1999, at Al (reporting that 92% of murder victims in Albuquer-
que knew their suspected killer).
415. See ADAMEC, supra note 1, at 4 (summarizing surveys revealing that
80% of respondents claimed they gained more friendship and companionship
from their pets than neighbors or friends); id. at 10 (asserting that the most de-
voted human mother cannot offer the unconditional love provided by a pet ani-
mal); SIFE, supra note 1, at 6 ("Above all, a pet is totally accepting and non-
judgmental.").
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